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16. 
 
Preface 
 
 
 
 
 
This report is part of a research project that assesses how military interventions can best 
prepare the ground for an effective long-term counter-terrorism policy. Three different cases 
have been studied, and they have each provided the input for the policy relevant 
recommendations that are presented in this report. The case studies concern the military 
intervention and transition in Afghanistan (2001), Libya (2011) and Mali (2013). The primary 
objectives of this research were: 
 
  To identify key success factors and best practices to be able to transform a broad 
military intervention, whether using a counter-insurgency or comprehensive approach, 
into a more limited, both in size and scope, counter-terrorism policy. 
  To identify elements for a longer-term counter-terrorism policy that would focus on 
alleviating the threat from terrorist groups, reinforcing host nation capacity and 
addressing some of the causes of radicalization and violent extremism. 
 
This project was conducted by Leiden University, the Australian National University (ANU) 
and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT). An initial workshop 
was   organised  to   help   formulate  the   research   questions  and   structure  the   reports. 
Subsequently, for each case study a draft report formed the setting for a one day, high-level 
expert meeting. A mix of around thirty policy-makers (including several serving or retired 
generals),  politicians  (including  two  former  Ministers  of  Defence)  and  international 
academics from different backgrounds attended the seminars and provided extremely valuable 
feedback on the draft reports. 
 
The high-level expert meetings were organised as follows: 
 
  Initial workshop to determine the framework study, held on 4 February 2015, Brussels, 
Belgium 
  Libya, held on 29 June 2015 The Hague, The Netherlands 
  Afghanistan, held on 10 September 2015, Brussels, Belgium 
  Mali, held on 7 December 2015, Lille, France 
 
The project has been made possible by NATO’s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) 
Programme. 
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Policy Recommendations 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Pre-intervention phase: improving decision-making by 
governments 
 
 
1.  Prevention is better than intervention A dearth of political will has notoriously 
thwarted attempts at preventing outbreaks of major conflict through binding decisions 
of the UN Security Council, but a range of other tools are available. These include 
measures to address factors such as the sponsorship of disruptive actors by states, 
looting of state resources by corrupt political leaders, and the spread of organised 
criminal activity. 
 
2.  Knowledge networks When capacity is not in-house, a knowledge-network could 
ensure that relevant cultural, historical and linguistic knowledge is quickly made 
available and accessible when necessary. Trust, however, ‘has a face’ and networks 
need  to  be  actively  maintained.  Furthermore,  conflict  situations  are  invariably 
complex, and it may be necessary to access a range of different kinds of expertise – 
political, economic, legal and anthropological – in order to secure a balanced picture. 
 
3.   Early warning and Intelligence The world is full of potential conflicts and budding 
crises. There will always be surprises, but an early warning methodology can ensure 
that governments are not caught wholly unprepared. Good intelligence on potentially 
unstable regions and countries is indispensable to support decision-making during 
crisis-situations.  While  intelligence  agencies  naturally  focus  on  identified  and 
potential adversaries, a risk management approach necessitates capacity with respect 
to areas that may seem stable and benign, but are not. Whether within intelligence, 
Defence or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, knowledge centres of specific crisis prone- 
regions should be nurtured. Making better use of existing early-warning networks and 
knowledge centres may be a low-cost way of accessing relevant information. 
 
 
4.   Meaning making Once a crisis or conflict has erupted, it is important to discern what 
it is about and what is at stake. Through an in depth analysis of the drivers of conflict, 
organisations can take stock of the potential local, regional and international 
implications. A thorough answer to “what is happening and why is it important?” 
leads to a better preparation for the question “what should we do?” that is invariably 
posed by politicians and decision-makers. Meaning-making frames the situation and is 
vital for garnering national and international support for an active policy on the issue. 
 
 
5.   International support Obtaining support from regional actors is very important in the 
pre-intervention phase, although some regions, such as Southwest Asia, lack strong 
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regional organizations. A broad support base can translate to a strong UN mandate for 
action. Nonetheless, the views of neighbouring countries can also be instructive. It is 
important also to note that support can dwindle over time; one way to minimise this 
risk is to have in place mechanisms of on-going engagement with regional actors. 
 
6.   Mapping local partners An intervening force will be judged at least in part by the 
company it chooses to keep. As a crisis develops and a military intervention becomes 
possible, local stakeholders and partners will need to be mapped. Some of these may 
prove to be reliable primary sources, possessing a situational awareness that national 
decision-makers and policy officers often lack. Others should best be avoided. 
International actors can end up inadvertently furthering the interests of unappetising 
local actors; this happened frequently in Afghanistan after 2001. 
 
7.   Legal mandate A precise legal mandate at the outset is vital to minimise the risk of 
subsequent disputes over exactly what actions a mission can properly involve. This is 
important   in   maintaining   support   for   an   intervention   in   intervening   states. 
Furthermore, public disputes over the purpose of an intervention risk emboldening 
those whose activities the intervention is designed to disrupt. 
 
8.   Establishing a strategic narrative Framing and bias in the media coverage of events 
can affect public support for or against an intervention and can prevent decision- 
makers from receiving a balanced overview of the situation in theatre. This can be 
offset by clear and coherent strategic narratives articulated by state leaders and the 
spokespersons of alliances and international organizations. This was arguably lacking 
in Afghanistan until at least 2008-2009, in part because the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
forced NATO countries to improvise in the Afghanistan theatre. It is therefore vital 
that any intervention be accompanied by appropriate strategies for the dissemination 
of information that can show how an intervention will serve the interests of the 
audience at home. In the host-nation state, the intervening powers will have to counter 
in a nuanced and sophisticated fashion the narratives being disseminated by opponents 
of the intervention. Too often, international actors focus simply on the spreading of 
images themselves doing what they think is good, rather than identifying the concerns 
of locals and responding to them. 
 
 
9. Contingency planning Early contingency planning by the relevant government 
ministries, including Foreign Affairs and Defence, is a precondition for effective 
eventual  deployment  of  military  assets.  While  this  might  not  seem  politically 
opportune at the time, and send an escalatory signal if made public, militaries need a 
minimum time-frame to mobilize technically and prepare forces for deployment. In 
Libya, NATO had weeks to plan and prepare for the intervention, and this proved just 
enough to launch the attack when the executive ordered it. The case of Mali illustrated 
how different planning scenarios developed by the French Ministry of Defence proved 
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instrumental in allowing a rapid military response to a surprise jihadist attack on 
Southern Mali. 
 
 
10. Action  over  inaction  When  the  spectre  of  impending  massacres  (framed  as  a 
‘Rwanda’ or ‘Srebrenica’) raises its head, politicians prefer action over inaction. The 
lack of available information or uncertainty pertaining to the long-term consequences 
of intervention, are of secondary consequence, just as a fire-fighter is not concerned by 
water damage. The Libyan intervention was in response to what was perceived to be 
an impending massacre at Benghazi, and the subsequent defeat of the rebels. While it 
inadvertently detracted from the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, future crises 
could again test its underlying validity. 
 
11. Long-term implications With fast news cycles and short term politics demanding 
rapid decisions, bureaucracies must reserve time and capacity to analyse the potential 
long-term implications of intervention or non-intervention. While ministerial 
departments exist to support the political course and line, a red-team construction or 
devil’s advocate office could offer an impartial dissenting opinion. Scenario planning 
would be an ideal instrument for high-level policy makers to illustrate possible 
outcomes or ‘end states’ of active involvement, and it is important to include non- 
military angles. 
 
B. Entry phase: the military intervention 
 
 
1.   Clear political objective An intervention should have a clear overarching political 
objective. Operation Serval in Mali serves as an example of a clear objective and 
mission. In response to the Malian government’s cry for help, the French military 
intervened to stop the Salafi-Jihadist attack on the South. The objective was to restore 
national territorial integrity, by reconquering the north from the three ‘occupying’ 
terrorist groups. NATO’s intervention in Libya was less clear-cut. It was mandated to 
impose a no-fly zone to protect civilians. The US, France and the UK were at pains to 
deny that ‘regime change’ was the objective, but emphasised that there could be no 
solution with Gaddafi remaining in power. This considerably complicated the military 
operation and the strategic narrative. 
 
2.   Speed of decision-making For escalating international conflict situations and crises, 
assuming that the intervening power works with a clear political objective and plans 
well, the faster an intervention is deployed, the greater its chances of success. 
Paradoxically, crises often have to attain a certain level of severity before enough 
political support in the intervening state can be mustered for active involvement. 
Appropriate contingency planning is essential if an intervention is to occur 
expeditiously. 
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3.   Military tactics subservient to political strategy Once combat has started, Ministries 
of  Defence  tend  to  dominate  policy  on  an  intervention,  often  overshadowing 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs or the Cabinet Office. This risks an excessive focus on 
tactical military objectives, to the detriment of overarching strategic (political) goals. 
Joint planning for the transition is required from the moment the intervention starts, 
with appropriate input from interested parties such as police and the NGO sector. 
 
4.  Light versus heavy footprint A ‘light footprint’ with no boots on the ground will 
minimize risks of entanglement and maximize local ownership, but similarly limit the 
ability of the international community to provide security during the transition. A 
strong and decisive host nation government can compensate for this, but post- 
intervention Libya has illustrated how insecurity tends to be self-perpetuating, and 
Afghanistan suffered greatly from the failure to expand ISAF beyond Kabul in early 
2002.  Without  a  basic  level  of  human  security,  attempts  at  state-building, basic 
humanitarian programmes or economic development will be stifled. 
 
5.   End date or end state A mission can be mandated for a fixed period of time or made 
conditional on certain achievements or criteria. The choice is an important one and 
determines the leeway for the political debate on an eventual prolongation of the 
mission. An ‘end-date’ mission provides a fixed timetable to exit and necessitates a 
renegotiation of the mandate if any kind of further involvement is deemed desirable, 
while an ‘end state’ mission offers more room for manoeuvre to adapt the mission to 
domestic or local circumstances. An ‘end-date’ model, if it proves overly-optimistic, 
can create real dilemmas over how properly to respond to unanticipated threats to an 
orderly transition. 
 
6.   Collateral damage Precise targeting to avoid collateral damage and civilian casualties 
is a conditio sine qua non for military interventions. This is not only dictated by 
humanitarian law (ius in bello); it is also essential for retaining public support. While 
civilian infrastructure such as power stations and media centres can in certain cases 
form legitimate military targets, their destruction will complicate later phases. During 
Operation Unified Protector in Libya, the oil and gas sector were wisely spared 
destruction and would provide the state, when not threatened by non-state actors, with 
essential income. 
 
 
7.   Structuring intelligence cooperation Sharing of intelligence is based on trust. The 
Five Eyes intelligence community has institutionalized sharing to a large extent, and 
during NATO’s mission in Afghanistan much effort was devoted to changing 
mentalities from ‘need to know’ to ‘need to share’. Intelligence sharing within NATO 
but outside the Five Eyes is often still ad hoc, and much can be gained by setting up a 
new intelligence hub at the start of the mission. While the Dutch were temporarily 
admitted to the Five Eyes community during their tenure as lead nation for Uruzgan 
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(Afghanistan), French requests to accede during the Libya operation were rebutted. 
Once the decision has been taken by a coalition to intervene, direct covenants and 
agreements between participating intelligence entities would greatly facilitate the 
exchange of data and information. Fusion cells and a focus that is not solely limited to 
‘enemy forces’ would greatly increase the value of intelligence for decision-makers. 
 
 
8.   Arming rebels Arming factions on the ground, even when part of a seemingly secular 
opposition to a regime in Africa/the Middle East, entails both short and long-term 
risks. The choice for a light footprint intervention, such as the initial American 
overthrow of the Taliban regime and NATO’s campaign in Libya, implies that local 
rebel forces must do the fighting and need arms and ammunition to succeed. In Libya, 
different rebel factions were armed covertly in order to avoid directly contravening the 
international arms embargo that had been imposed at the start of the conflict. Most 
importantly, the weapons – whether classified as ‘light’ or not – can end up in the 
wrong hands, or be turned on the wrong people as allied rebels become Islamist 
opponents. 
 
9.   Addressing critical shortages Since NATO’s 1999 Operation Allied Force (Kosovo), 
several critical shortfalls in capacity, specifically on the European side, have been 
identified. These include Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance   (ISTAR)   platforms   and   capacity,   aerial   refuelling,   precision 
munitions and strategic transport. These shortages have still not been alleviated. 
France’s Operation Serval illustrated how national combat capacity proved sufficient 
to tackle the jihadist groups in Mali; but it was completely dependent on Allied 
logistical support to enable the operations. Addressing the shortages in Allied capacity 
will  reduce  the  fragile  foundations  of  intervention capacity,  and  allow  for  more 
efficient military operations. 
 
10. Analysing  regional  fallout  Before  the  intervention  and  during  the  transition, 
implications for the wider region need to be analysed. This can best be done through 
intra-interdepartmental task forces in Ministries of Foreign Affairs, that transcend 
organisational divides such as the MENA and Sub-Saharan categorizations. 
Interconnected relationship between countries, ethnic groups/tribes and regions need 
to considered. The possible responses of regional ‘spoilers’ need to be taken very 
seriously: the continuing availability of operating sanctuaries in Pakistan for the 
Afghan Taliban gravely complicated efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. 
 
C.  Transition phase: towards local ownership 
 
 
1.   Maintain momentum After the successful entry phase, high-level decision-makers 
can easily be distracted by other crises and lose interest in the slow process of 
transition. Libya provides the textbook example of a united front organising an 
intervention, and dissolving the moment that the military objective was met, with 
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multiple problems left unsolved that could potentially prove very damaging to the 
interests of the coalition’s members. 
 
 
2.   Ensuring  the  provision  of  security  Once  the  main  combat  phase  is  over,  the 
authorities  are  expected  to  facilitate  a  quick  return  to  normalcy  and  provide  a 
modicum of security. A state that cannot manage this risks losing legitimacy in the 
eyes   of   the   population.  Without  assistance  from   intervening  powers,   or   an 
international security force, this can be an insurmountable challenge for the incoming 
government, as the case study of Libya illustrated. The stated NATO objective of 
protecting civilians effectively ceased once Gaddafi was killed, and while both the 
intervening powers and the host-nation state were adamant in not wanting ‘foreign’ 
boots on the ground, the security situation nosedived as a result. 
 
 
3.   Do  not  hasten  elections  The  international  community  has  indicated  a  strong 
preference for rapidly organising national elections in the host-nation state after the 
military intervention. This is to confer legitimacy on their new governmental partners, 
and to fulfil essential criteria allowing the transfer of aid and donor money. It is, 
however, folly to expect an inexperienced government, devoid of a functioning 
bureaucracy or a capable security force, to perform even elementary governmental 
functions in a complex post-conflict situation. While the newly elected might enjoy 
international legitimacy, they will have none at home if they cannot provide basic 
security and state services to the local population. In hindsight, the elections in Libya 
were held too early, with the government lacking essential capacity even to have a 
chance  of  success.  Elections  are  divisive  activities  that  create  losers  as  well  as 
winners; and they are rule-governed activities that lose all credibility if the key rules 
on candidature, voting and scrutiny cannot be dispassionately enforced. 
 
4.   Whole of government approach During the Libya intervention, the United Kingdom 
dispatched an “International Stabilisation Response Team” (ISRT) to the country, 
consisting of different experts in the fields of security, economy and justice. This 
concept of sending a multi-disciplinary team to take stock of the local situation, meet 
stakeholders and set out a transition plan deserves follow-up in future crises. Ideally 
the focus would not just be on the short term and there would have to be some follow- 
up. Integrating the approaches of diplomacy, development and defence (3D) combines 
the  necessary  skills-sets  and  ensures  policy  is  aligned  between  the  involved 
government departments. Such a comprehensive approach, which the Netherlands and 
Canada sought to follow in Afghanistan, is not a panacea, but it can improve the 
quality of performance on the ground. 
 
 
5.   Counter-terrorism versus counterinsurgency It is important to distinguish between 
insurgents, terrorists and criminals, as the designated label channels a policy reaction 
that  is  anchored  in  the  very  different  fields  of  counter-terrorism  and  counter- 
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insurgency (COIN) or law enforcement, each centred around its own principles, 
dogmas and common practices. The COIN approach as conducted in Afghanistan 
became very military-centric, and more sequential (shape, clear, hold and build) than 
for instance the comprehensive approach, which could see simultaneous efforts of 
diplomats, aid workers and the military. A counter-terrorism approach that focuses on 
removing the drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism would ideally be civilian- 
led. 
 
6.   Focus on good governance In the long run, good governance probably matters more 
than infrastructural development, although it may be much harder to deliver. To the 
extent  that  international  actors  have  any  capacity  to  influence  the  form  that 
governance takes in the aftermath of an intervention, they will need to show their 
hands early. There is typically only one chance to get things right, and if the structure 
and functioning of government prove dysfunctional, there are likely to be plenty of 
beneficiaries of the dysfunctional system who will fight hard to retain it. Afghanistan 
after 2001 provides an unhappily clear example of this. 
 
7.   Security Sector Reform It is important to start early and commit for the long run 
where SSR is concerned, building partnerships with key institutions and figures. An 
inclusive approach through a national dialogue campaign is essential. Failure on this 
front is likely to blight endeavours on many others, as the case of Libya clearly 
illustrates. Effort should focus not just on the technical capacity of the soldier or 
police officer, but also the organisation behind him or her. Without a sound HR- 
policy, a clear command and control structure and effective administrative and 
logistical procedures, trained units cannot be deployed or sustained. 
 
8.   Strengthen human security not just state security Much capacity building in the 
security sector is state-centric and focused on institutions and security organisations. 
In  many conflict areas,  including areas  in  Afghanistan and  Mali, the police and 
military are the cause of insecurity and are distrusted by parts of the population. This 
needs to be recognised as a problem, since misbehaviour by agencies of the state will 
ultimately contaminate the state’s reputation and legitimacy. The intervening powers 
will need to be aware of power structures and networks within the politico-security 
establishment, to prevent vested interests trumping human security in the country. 
 
 
9.  Bottom up approach In deeply tribal societies, once institutional deadlock has 
occurred, a top-down approach will not resolve the problem. Local stakeholders will 
need to be stimulated to cooperate and contribute to conflict resolution at the micro- 
level. To the extent that they can, international actors should resist the temptation to 
see a strong central state as ‘the’ solution to a country’s problems. In any transition, 
there are troubling questions to be asked about the appropriate scope, strength, and 
structure of the state for the future. Rather than rushing discussion of these questions, 
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it is better if possible to address them through inclusive dialogue between many 
different social forces, with special attention to groups that might otherwise be 
marginalised, including women and ethnic minorities. 
 
10. Beware of militias Militias can provide local security where government capacity is 
lacking, but the solution is short term. Militias are only accountable to the local 
strong-man, their interests do not align with those of the national government and their 
modus operandi often entails violation of basic human rights. In Libya, the militias 
refused the government’s instruction to disarm, and there was no capacity or political 
will to enforce the order. They were subsequently integrated into the security 
structures, initially formalising their position and strengthening their capacity, and 
later causing the fracturing of the security apparatus along factional lines. In 
Afghanistan, some similar problems were encountered, partly because international 
actors were not particularly skilled at distinguishing local power holders with some 
degree of legitimacy from local power holders who were mainly coercive and 
extractive. 
 
11. Provision of basic state services A population in a conflict area does not judge the 
government on its counter-terrorism strategy, but on the provision of basic state 
services such as electricity, drinking water, health care and education. If these are non- 
existent or seriously lacking, government legitimacy will suffer. In the north of Mali, 
two years after the French intervention, the state is still struggling to deliver these 
basic services. As a result, certain elements of the population are developing some 
nostalgia for the time that the jihadists were in control, and actually managed to ensure 
more consistent electricity provision than the state. 
 
12. Becoming a battlefield for regional powers Weak states unwittingly invite strong 
neighbours to safeguard their own interests on their territory. This can take benign 
forms, but can also fuel local conflicts when foreign powers actively support their own 
proxies or allies. In Libya, both Qatar and Turkey have supported Islamist factions 
that oppose the elected government in Tobruk. In Afghanistan, Pakistan has played a 
nefarious role in consistently providing a safe-haven to the strategic leadership of the 
Taliban. While in the latter case, the US and NATO have deliberately chosen not to 
confront their ally, strong international diplomacy could have limited external 
involvement in Libya. Addressing this challenge can require frank and difficult 
conversations with close allies. 
 
 
13. Metrics for progress Quality data can be very useful for appraising aspects of a 
transition process, especially if they are gathered with sensitivity to local complexity, 
and can be analysed in a statistically-sophisticated fashion. At the same time, over 
reliance on rigidly-structured metrics, such as enemy killed in action or territory 
nominally under control of the government, risks neglecting important factors that 
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may not lend themselves easily to quantification, such as patron-client relationships 
within elites. The best data are likely to be those gathered after careful consultation 
with specialists on the countries or areas under discussion. The right metrics need to 
be determined at the beginning of the deployment, as changing criteria will pollute 
databases and render comparisons difficult. 
 
14. Military exit  is  not  end  of  involvement  Public discourse revolves  around ‘exit 
strategies’, ‘entanglement’ and ‘bringing the boys home’. This frame is misleading, as 
involvement in and engagement with the host-nation typically does not end, but takes 
on a different, civilian shape. The earlier the civilian effort has been part of the 
intervention,  the  easier  it  will  be  to  reduce  the  military  element  and  maintain 
continuity. An integrated approach from the outset has more to offer than an attempt to 
mount a sudden ‘civilian surge’; appropriate personnel may not be available for the 
latter, and expectations of what can result may be unrealistically high. 
 
15. The problem of narcotics The drug trade can play an enormous role in fuelling local 
conflict and increasing insecurity. Drugs, however, are not the most significant part in 
the  revenue  model  of  the  Salafi-Jihadist  groups  in  Mali  (hostage  ransoms), 
Afghanistan (funds from awqaf and wealthy donors in the Gulf) or Libya (crime and 
other traffic). Local governments play a more important role in the drug trade, often 
promoting or facilitating the traffic of drugs or preventing the prosecution of 
smugglers. Approaching the drug trade through the prism of counter-terrorism is 
therefore counterproductive, as the primary effort must be focused on reforming 
government institutions and cultures. The Afghanistan case suggests that at a certain 
point it can become very difficult to crack down on narcotics because of the risk that 
large numbers of small producers and labourers might be driven straight into the arms 
of the armed opposition. 
 
16. Managing   expectations   Too  often,  interventions  lead  to   unrealistically  high 
expectations which are then disappointed. Rather than fuelling such expectations, it is 
better to try to create low expectations, and then exceed them. Interventions create 
their own momentum, and can result in unintended consequences that are greater than 
the envisaged ones. Avoiding rigidity, the intervening powers and host nation state 
will need to navigate crises while continuing to work towards a politically inclusive 
settlement. Both the tasks of rebuilding conflict-stricken societies and addressing the 
causes that contribute to terrorism are long-term efforts, requiring time, perseverance 
and a dose of good fortune. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper forms part of a project conducted by Leiden University and Australian National 
University for NATO’s Science for Peace Project. The project strives to provide insight into 
the process of transitioning from military interventions to long-term counter-terrorism policy, 
and the reports will formulate both key success factors and lessons learned that could be of 
help when planning such a transition. Given the topic of this project, the case of Libya is 
somewhat peculiar. In contrast to the other two case studies in this project, the military 
operations in Afghanistan (2001-2016) and Mali (2013-2016), the intervention in Libya was 
not a response to a terrorist threat. Rather, the mission was first and foremost aimed at 
protecting Libyan civilians from the Gaddafi regime, and was also justified as such by the 
intervening powers. At the same time, however, during the military intervention, the US, 
France and UK made it clear that protecting civilians would require overthrowing the Gaddafi 
regime. The day after Gaddafi was captured and killed in October 2011, NATO Secretary 
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced that the mission would be terminated. A military 
intervention aimed at protecting civilians does not necessarily need to transform into long- 
term counter-terrorism policy. 
 
Unfortunately, in today’s Libya, terrorism is a greater threat than it was prior to the 
intervention. The country is currently embroiled in civil war, enabling terrorist groups like 
Islamic State (IS) to gain a foothold. The case of Libya was unique in the sense that the 
mission had a so-called ‘light-footprint strategy’ and that post-intervention efforts were 
limited. No international peacekeeping force was deployed. The continued involvement of the 
intervening powers was mostly limited to the United Nations Support Mission in Libya 
(UNSMIL), which started its mission in 2011, one month before Gaddafi was killed. The 
mission explicitly focused on “support[ing] the country’s new transitional authorities in their 
post-conflict  efforts”. 1  The  mandate  has  been  extended  several  times,  most  recently  in 
September 2015, when the Security Council authorised its presence up to March 2016.
2
 
 
At the end of NATO’s military intervention, assessments were initially optimistic. In March 
2012, Ivo Daalder, U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of NATO, and James G. 
Stavridis,  NATO’s  Supreme  Allied  Commander Europe  (SACEUR)  wrote  an  article  in 
Foreign Affairs, opening with the statement that “NATO’s operation in Libya has rightly been 
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hailed  as  a  model  intervention”. 3  Four  years  later  it  can  be  argued  that  the  lessons  of 
Afghanistan and Iraq were perhaps overlearned with the light footprint in Libya. Due to a 
combination of different factors, the intervening powers only provided a minimum of post- 
conflict aid and assistance, remaining on the sidelines as Libya descended into chaos and 
internal conflict. The security situation continues to deteriorate and has already led to the 
death of more than 4.500 people.
4 
Institutions are deadlocked with two separate governments, 
one in Tobruk in the east of Libya and another in Tripoli in the west, both claiming to be the 
legitimate authority. Adding to this volatile situation is the fact that Islamic State (IS) has 
consolidated its presence in Libya over the past year. This worsening security situation has led 
to speculation that another military intervention is being considered, this time reportedly led 
by the US and France, and supported by Italy and the UK.
5 
It has been reported that, amongst 
others, French Special Forces have already been involved in covert operations against the 
group Islamic State in Libya.
6
 
 
In August 2014, during a frank and open interview with Op-Ed columnist Thomas L. 
Friedman, President Obama reflected on some of the lessons he learned in foreign policy. 
Intervening in Libya to prevent a massacre was the right thing to do, he argued, but doing it 
without sufficient follow-up on the ground to manage Libya’s transition to more democratic 
politics was probably his biggest foreign policy regret. 
 
Had we not intervened, it’s likely that Libya would be Syria. ... And so there would be 
more death, more disruption, more destruction. But what is also true is that I think we 
[and] our European partners underestimated the need to come in full force if you’re 
going to do this. Then it’s the day after Qaddafi is gone, when everybody is feeling 
good and everybody is holding up posters saying, ‘Thank you, America.’ At that 
moment, there has to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies that didn’t 
have any civic traditions. ... So that’s a lesson that I now apply every time I ask the 
question, ‘Should we intervene, militarily? Do we have an answer [for] the day after? 
7 
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2 Country and conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 National and international context 
 
On February 15, 2011, Libyan human rights activist Fethi Tarbel was arrested. Hundreds of 
people took to the streets in Benghazi to protest. Within a week, a popular revolt had spread to 
other cities in the country, marking the beginning of what would be called the Libyan 
Revolution. Libya’s man in power, Muammar Gaddafi, made it clear that he would not accept 
a rebellion and would not shy away from using force to suppress it. The events in Libya did 
not stand on their own. The Libyan people saw the strongman on their western border – the 
Tunisian Zine El Abedine Ben Ali – fall from power in January 2011, soon followed by 
Egyptian Hosni Mubarak on their eastern frontier in February. Inspired by these events, the 
Libyans  felt  confident  to  rise  against  Gaddafi’s  repressive  regime.  When  the  protests 
continued on 17 February, two days after the initial protest in Benghazi, Gaddafi-forces fired 
into the crowds, killing a number of protesters.
8 
Soon, rebel forces were formed, nominally 
joining forces under the National Transitional Council (NTC). In essence these forces 
constituted, as Jason Pack argues, multiple uprisings, each run by different factions with 
diverging interests, but one common enemy: Gaddafi.
9 
These rebel forces were able to depose 
Gaddafi after several months of conflict, with help from France, the United Kingdom, the 
United States and later the allies partaking in the NATO Operation Unified Protector. 
 
Although effectively putting an end to the country’s dictatorship, Gaddafi’s death did not 
mark the beginning of a stable and peaceful future for Libya. The country quickly descended 
into civil war. At the time of writing, Libya has two governments: one seated in the capital of 
Tripoli and the other in the Eastern city of Tobruk, representing the so-called ‘Dawn’ and 
‘Dignity’ factions. Both claim to be the legitimate rulers of post-revolutionary Libya. The 
current lack of a central government has also allowed jihadist groups like Islamic State (IS) to 
take advantage of the situation and establish a presence in the country.
10 
As a result, the 
country is highly unstable. 
 
While  far  from  being  democratic,  Libya  had  been  a  moderately  stable  country  under 
Gaddafi’s reign. On the Fragile States Index (the former Failed States Index) by the Fund for 
Peace, it was consistently among the better half of the world’s ranked countries. In 2010, 
Libya was  ranked 111  out of 177  (with 1 being the  ‘most failed’ state), outperforming 
countries such as Iran (32), Syria (48), Egypt (49), Russia (80), Turkey (89), Mexico (96) or 
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Ukraine (109).
11 
Two years later, Libya set the record for “the most severe year-on worsening 
of a country in the history of the index”, falling from its 111th place in 2011 to the 50th place 
in 2012.
12
 
 
This relatively good score prior to the revolution is somewhat misleading. For instance, it 
does not accurately convey how the concept of Libya as a unified state proved difficult to 
maintain. Historically, Libya was a compilation of three regions – Tripolitania in the north- 
west, Fezzan in the south-west, and Cyrenaica in the east. When Libya was part of the 
Ottoman Empire (from 1551 to 1911), these regions were separate provinces. The regional 
entities continued to exist during Italian rule until World War II and in the period from 
independence up to 1963. After the 2011 revolution, once the militias no longer needed to 
cooperate in the fight against their common enemy, geographical and ethnical differences re- 
emerged as divisive factors. As such the on-going political and armed struggle in Libya is 
primarily about power and resources, with the ideological element secondary to these two.
13
 
 
 
2.2 History 
 
After being part of the Ottoman Empire for four centuries, the three provinces of Cyrenaica, 
Tripolitania and Fezzan came under Italian control in 1911. While first known as Italian North 
Africa, the country received its current name in 1934. The Italian presence came to an end 
during World War II and after the defeat of Italian troops in 1943, Libya was administered by 
the  Allies  until  1951.  The  British  administrated  the  two  former  Italian  provinces  of 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, while the French administered the province of Fezzan. In 1951 
Libya gained its independence, and was subsequently ruled by King Idris for the following 18 
years. His reign came to an abrupt end in 1969 after a coup d’état by a group of colonels, 
among them  Muammar Gaddafi.  The discovery of  oil  and  a  perceived rise  in  Western 
influence had led to growing public discontent with the monarchy.
14 
The discovery of oil in 
the late 1950s contributed to a rise in national income; revenue that was nonetheless not 
equally  shared  between  most  of  Libya’s  citizens,  resulting  in  a  widespread  feeling  of 
inequality. 
 
When Gaddafi took power, he was initially one of the strongest supporters of Pan-Arabism 
and the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and was disillusioned by the Arab defeat 
during the Six Days War of 1967.
15 
Gaddafi tried to unite Libya with other Arab states on 
multiple occasions, albeit without success. The three key words of Gaddafi’s new programme, 
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outlined in his ‘Green Book’, were freedom, socialism and unity. He also promoted Islam in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
16 
This combination of socialism and religion was one of the reasons why 
Libya did not align with either the Western or Communist Bloc during the Cold War. Rather, 
it saw itself as an important player in the Non Aligned Movement. In this context, Gaddafi 
consistently supported revolutionary movements of all sorts.
17 
This not only included support 
for Islamist revolutionary movements, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the 
Philippines
18
, but went as far as to support separatist and leftist terrorist organisations, such as 
the Irish Republican Army, the Red Army Faction, the Red Brigades or the Colombian 
FARC. He also intervened in Chad on multiple occasions, attempting unsuccessfully to annex 
the Aouzou strip in northern Chad between 1978 and 1987. 
 
The UN imposed sanctions on the country after Gaddafi refused to cooperate with 
investigations into the Lockerbie bombing of 1988 that killed 270 people and the bombing of 
the French UTA flight 772 over Niger in 1989.
19 
Only in 2003, when the Libyan suspects 
were tried, were these sanctions lifted. 
20 
That year marked a turn in diplomatic relations 
between Gaddafi and the West. The removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime, plus the US 
intelligence operations that uncovered Gaddafi’s covert weapons of mass destruction 
programme, helped convince him to abandon these programmes. Considered a pariah since 
1988, Gaddafi was rehabilitated and could now restore diplomatic relations with the West. 
Bilateral relations with many countries improved, energy and arms contracts were sealed and 
Libya was regarded a potential ally in the war against terrorism after 9/11.
21
 
 
 
2.3 Localism and tribalism 
 
Two concepts were important in shaping Libyan society: localism and tribalism. According to 
Alison Pargeter, localism - the prioritisation of the local level in contrast to the centralised 
state - in North African countries contributed to increasing radicalization in eastern Libya, 
which considered itself distinct from the rest of this country. This region also avoided taxation 
during the rule of the Ottoman Empire and fiercely rebelled against Italian colonial rule. 
Libya’s history of the three separate provinces thus prevented the establishment of a strong 
sense of national identity.
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Another pillar of Libyan society is its tribal composition, with approximately 20 major tribes 
vying for power, resources and influence. During the 2011 uprising, differences between 
tribes and regions were often temporarily bridged to pursue their common goal of 
overthrowing the Gaddafi regime. After the disappearance of this common enemy, tribal 
identities and localism once again became highly salient.
23
 
 
 
2.4 Radical Islam and terrorism 
 
Although Libya had never been confronted with large-scale terrorist campaigns, radical Islam 
had been able to gain a foothold in parts of the country. Especially in the eastern region of 
Cyrenaica, radical Islamist groups have taken root. The Libyan branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, as well as other militant cells, originated mostly from eastern cities such as 
Benghazi, Derna and Ajdabia. Although some of the commanders of these groups came from 
Tripoli, the large majority of the members, as well as most of the sympathisers, could be 
found in the eastern part of the country.
24 
Recently, however, much of the support, logistics 
and planning for Islamist groups is shifting westward, and at the last three elections in Libya, 
Islamists performed better in places like Misrata, Tripoli and Zawia than in eastern cities, 
such as Benghazi, Tobruk and Ejdabyia.
25
 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, many foreign fighters from Libya attended training camps in 
Afghanistan or joined the global jihad. It has been estimated that at least 500 Libyans joined 
the Arab-Afghans who were fighting the Soviet Union in the 1980s.
26 
Some fighters returned 
to Libya but others moved on to different conflict zones, training, for example, with Al Qaeda 
in Sudan. Gaddafi, while supporting terrorist groups in other countries, violently repressed 
Islamist groups in his own country. According to an analysis by the Jamestown Foundation, a 
combination of factors in the early 1990s paved the way for an Islamist uprising: Gaddafi’s 
devious interpretation of Islam according to the Salafists, endemic corruption, economic 
mismanagement, and the 1992 UN Sanctions taken after the Lockerbie Bombing.
27 
Between 
1992 and 1996, Islamist opposition began to organise and several groups were involved in 
successful  attacks  against  the  regime,  on  occasion  liberating  detained  Islamists  from 
Gaddafi’s prisons. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was responsible for most 
terrorist attacks in Libya, but Gaddafi’s violent crackdown killed or imprisoned most of its 
fighters by the end of the millennium.
28
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Overall, the Global Terrorism Database only registered 16 terrorist incidents in Libya between 
1970 and 2011.
29 
Although incidents are probably underreported, it is clear that the threat 
posed by terrorist groups in Libya was limited compared to neighbouring countries. Egypt, for 
instance, witnessed 489 incidents in the same period. Although the LIFG was more or less 
inactive in Libya in the 2000s, this did not mean Islamism in Libya had vanished. Many 
Libyan foreign fighters travelled to Iraq between 2003 and 2008 to fight American troops. 
According to the Global Terrorism Database, more than 60% came from Derna and 24% from 
Benghazi, both in the east of the country. 
30  
During the 2011  revolution, many dormant 
Islamist groups joined the uprising against Gaddafi while others resumed their activities once 
Gaddafi’s repressive regime was gone. Some former LIFG members formed the Abu Salim 
Martyrs’ Brigade that began to control parts of Derna following the revolution.31 Another 
well-known Islamist group created by former members of pre-revolution Islamist groups is 
Ansar al-Sharia. Some of its members were allegedly involved in the 2012 attack on the US 
consulate in Benghazi that killed US Ambassador Christopher Stevens.
32
 
 
 
2.5 Conflict causes 
 
When analysing the origins of a conflict, in hindsight it is always relatively simple to identify 
the trigger events and proximate causes. In the case of Libya, the arrest of a human rights 
activist was the direct trigger that activated a spiral of escalating violence, and the context of 
the Arab Spring was the proximate cause. It is, however, much more difficult to identify 
indirect and structural causes for the revolt against the Gaddafi regime. 
 
According to Emanuela Paoletti, the uprising in Libya took most observers by surprise, but 
revealed long-standing internal divisions in the country. 
33 
These internal divisions mainly 
revolved around the socio-economic differences between the regions in the country. Not all 
areas enjoyed the same living standards and levels of development. Some argue that the 
eastern region of Cyrenaica had been punished for Islamic extremism by the Gaddafi regime, 
by being kept in a state of poverty and underdevelopment.
34 
It was also in this region, in the 
city of Benghazi, that the 2011 uprising started. These regional differences had a negative 
impact on the formation of a national, shared identity. 
 
Besides the absence of a strong national identity, there was also a clear absence of a 
functioning state. This was in part due to the autocratic and idiosyncratic traits of Gaddafi and 
his governance style. However, Libya also provides a confirmatory case study of the concept 
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of the so-called resource curse
35 
, which argues that natural wealth (Libya’s enormous oil 
reserves) can lead to less democracy. In Libya there was, a) a lack of export diversification, 
and b) no need to invest in state structure. As a result of the enormous revenues that were 
generated by oil export, Gaddafi saw no need in developing other sectors or diversifying the 
economy, although he did invest in agriculture.
36 
It has been estimated that in the mid-2000s, 
95 per cent of the export earnings originated from the oil sector and that it accounted for 80 
per cent of all government revenues.
37 
Unemployment was around 20 per cent in 2008 and 16 
per  cent  lived  below  the  poverty  line. 
38   
Consequently,  Libya’s  economy  remained 
underdeveloped and  vulnerable. As  a result of  the abundance of oil, the Libyan  ‘social 
contract’ was one where few taxes were paid, and few services were expected in return. 
Nonetheless, Gaddafi’s Green Book preached socialism, and he did invest in infrastructure, 
irrigation projects,  health  care  and  education,  albeit  to  limited  extent. 
39  
Fuel  and  many 
foodstuffs were also heavily subsidised. 
 
Perhaps the main factor that fuelled the uprising was the frustration with clientelism. Gaddafi 
reigned Libya with an iron fist, with all power centralized. On lower levels, power was mainly 
concentrated in the hands of just a few chosen tribes: the Wadhafa (Gaddafi’s own tribe), 
Warfalla and Magariha.
40 
The level just below Gaddafi – his advisors – were known as the 
“men of the tent” and were very much dependent on family and tribal relations. 41 Good 
(indirect) personal relations with the regime were essential for those aspiring to a career 
within the Libyan government apparatus. Those that were excluded from these networks 
would, as part of a large group of ‘have-nots’, support the overthrow of Gaddafi. 
 
Still, it is important not to overestimate the importance of tribal relations in Libya. Although 
the tribal system was effectively employed by Gaddafi, the importance of tribes had decreased 
since the 1970s, mainly as a result of rapid urbanisation. Also, in cities like Tripoli, prominent 
families rather than tribes play a significant role.
42 
According to Lacher, “[t]owns and cities 
were  at  least  as  important  as  the  tribes  as  the  reference  units  of  mobilization  for  the 
revolutionary struggle”.43 
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3 Pre-intervention phase 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Pre-entry phase: Decision-making & political context 
 
The decision to intervene in Libya was neither easy, nor was it immediately expected at the 
first signs of the rebellion. Initially, the odds seemed to be largely against any intervention. 
For one, a foreign intervention was simply deemed unnecessary by the West. Uprisings in 
neighbouring Egypt and Tunisia resulted relatively quickly in the removal of their former 
leaders. In the first weeks of the Libyan uprising, there was no reason to think this case would 
be any different. There were also several external factors that did not favour an intervention. 
 
The first of those was the enormous drain of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2011, 
NATO’s efforts still fielded a significant force in Afghanistan and disillusionment with the 
results on the ground was creeping in. There was neither political nor public support in most 
Western countries for another adventure on foreign soil.
44 
As US Secretary of Defence Robert 
Gates put it bluntly on 24 February, “any future defence secretary who advises the president 
to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should 
have his  head  examined”. 45  This argument resonated particularly strongly in  the  United 
States, which had borne the brunt of these missions. 
 
A second external reason was the financial crisis in Europe. Many European countries had 
significantly cut their defence budgets over the past years, in contrast to the US. 
46  
The 
reluctance of the European allies in NATO to invest in defence had always been a contentious 
point. Since the end of the Cold War, the US increasingly argued for a more balanced level of 
burden-sharing between the allies. The US shirked from an overly pro-active role in Libya – 
Europe’s neighbour, after all – as it could send out the wrong signal, allowing European 
partners to again lean on the US and let it shoulder the responsibility for action. 
 
The Western non-interventionist attitude was turned on its head by internal developments in 
Libya. It soon became clear that the rebels were unable to accomplish a quick military victory. 
The humanitarian situation deteriorated quickly. Gaddafi’s public call on February 22 to 
“cleanse Libya house by house”, “alley to alley” (the famous “zenga zenga” phrase) to drive 
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out the “rats” and “cockroaches” seemed to warn of an impending massacre. 47 With this 
statement, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)-doctrine suddenly became an issue within the 
United Nations. In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 60/1 
following the World Summit, forming the basis of this idea of a Responsibility to Protect. In 
this resolution paragraph 139, the UNGA stipulated that 
 
the international community (…) has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means (…) to help to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, 
we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council (…), should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.
48
 
 
This R2P-doctrine was  formed as  a reaction to the international community’s failure to 
prevent the genocides in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995). As much as the interventions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrated the limits of Western military involvement, the examples 
of Rwanda and Srebrenica symbolised the risks of non-intervention. Former US President Bill 
Clinton has mentioned on many occasions that his decision to not intervene in Rwanda was 
one of his greatest regrets; this situation is something that both French President Nicholas 
Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron wanted to avoid.
49 
As reports of gross 
human rights violations in Libya were being published by the media, and an impending 
massacre in Benghazi seemed forthcoming, many within the UN argued that the R2P-doctrine 
was applicable. Although some now debate the accurateness of the view of impending 
genocide in Libya – as Alan Kuperman does in his article “Lessons from Libya: How Not to 
Intervene”50 - it is without doubt that at that time the international community did fear an 
impending massacre. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight there are always facts and indicators that refute the accuracy of 
the expectation at the time, but decision-makers had to decide quickly, under great pressure 
and on the basis of limited information. Considering Gaddafi’s personal record and the threats 
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he made, the case for an intervention can be argued still. Recent research has confirmed 
reporting  bias  in  the  coverage  of  the  Libyan  conflict,  with  media  in  democracies 
demonstrating a pro-challenger, opposition bias, and media in non-democracies confirming a 
pro-incumbency bias.
51 
In Western democracies, over-reporting of the insurgents’ case and 
their suffering at the hands of Gaddafi, framed with sympathy for their cause, might have 
played a significant role in nudging decision-makers towards military intervention. 
 
 
3.2 France and the United Kingdom 
 
The two countries that initially pushed most for an international military intervention were 
France and the United Kingdom, with a particularly strong role for French President Sarkozy. 
Sarkozy’s political style was characterized by initiative, impulse and action, and in 2008 he 
had been instrumental in leading EU attempts to broker a ceasefire between Georgia and 
Russia. In the first months of 2011, his poll ratings were low and an anonymous group of 
diplomats (le groupe Marly) criticised his international policy as extremely impulsive and 
amateurish.
52 
As the Arab Spring seemed to spread, his government was caught wrong-footed 
with Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie speaking in support of Tunisian strongman Ben 
Ali, saying that French security forces had the savoir faire to help combat the riots. Sarkozy 
was therefore quick to act on Libya, and the first one to call for a no-fly zone over the country 
at the end of February 2011. The media personality Bernard-Henri Lévy (BHL) proved to be a 
driving force for intervention and had direct access to Sarkozy. Most importantly, France 
became the first country on 10 March 2011 to officially recognise the National Transition 
Council (NTC) – the collection of rebel movements that had been formed only two weeks 
earlier.
53 
This political act was intended to create a fait-accompli, and surprised not only 
international leaders like Merkel and Cameron, but even the French Foreign Ministry.
54
 
 
In both France and the UK it was the president and the prime minister – Sarkozy and 
Cameron – who were most supportive of a military option, while military officials were more 
reluctant and cautious in their outlook. For the UK it was also important to support the Anglo- 
French Defense treaty that was signed a year before. Cameron was apparently also afraid of 
another Srebrenica and asked his defence officials to plan for military options.
55 
However, he 
also involved an attorney general to all the National Security Council’s meetings and tasked 
Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell with drawing up a stabilisation plan for Libya, 
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incorporating lessons  learned  from  Iraq. 
56  
The  French  and  the  British  had,  however,  a 
different position on who should take the lead in a military mission. Although both supported 
the involvement of the US, the British sought a NATO-lead whereas the French initially 
preferred not to involve NATO. The French reasoning was based on external perceptions, 
considering that NATO was perceived to have an aggressive image in the Arab world.
57 
The 
aspect of  regional support  was  also  deemed essential by  the  UK,  which  laid  out  three 
conditions for their support of a military action: 
 
1)  Demonstrable need for military action 
2)  Sound legal basis 
3)  Strong regional support
58
 
 
Eventually, the British and French agreed on a joint action plan. With the UK in favour of a 
NATO- lead, and other allies, such as Italy, ruling out participation if it was not under NATO- 
flag, France agreed with the mission being transferred to NATO. From a practical military 
perspective this was easier than keeping a Franco-British lead. The different missions became 
NATO Unified Protector on 31 March 2011. In both the US and the UK, it was the Foreign 
Office and State Department that were pushing for an intervention, with Defence ministries 
much more reluctant to get involved. 
 
 
3.3 The United States 
 
The US administration was initially split on the issue of intervening in Libya. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton was a cautious proponent for intervention, whilst Defence Secretary 
Robert Gates was sceptical. In his memoir, Gates recalled that Obama told him it was a “51- 
49” decision.59 As the humanitarian situation deteriorated in Libya, the US was edged into 
action by the perception of an imminent threat to civilians in Benghazi. 
60 
This was only 
possible after the support of regional players, the UNSC-resolution, plus the French and 
British promise to take the lead in the intervention. Key to the Allied decision to intervene 
was the standpoint of the Arab League. Its public call for a no-fly zone on 12 March would be 
followed by other countries and form one of the key elements of UN Resolution 1973. The 
Arab League’s support and the active contribution of Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates broadened the coalition and undercut potential criticism of the intervention as a 
‘neo-colonialist’ project. In addition, it helped to remove any doubts in the UNSC, especially 
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with regard to the Russian and Chinese vote on the matter. 
61 
Adding to the clamour for 
intervention was the statement by Ambassador Shalgam of Libya, who requested a UN- 
mandated intervention: “Libya was established by the United Nations…. We want a swift, 
decisive and courageous resolution”.62 Like several other Libyan ambassadors, he defected 
and supported a military intervention. 
 
 
3.4 Getting support in the UNSC 
 
The first crucial hurdle was to convince the United Nations Security Council to adopt a 
resolution that would  provide the international legal mandate for  such  an  effort.  In  the 
Council, the US took the position of “moderate interventionism”. 63 Others, such as non- 
permanent members Germany, Brazil and India, were more ambivalent. China, a staunch 
proponent of the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty, did not directly oppose 
the intervention either. The support of regional organisations such as the Arab League was 
crucial in persuading the Chinese not to veto any resolution, considering their significant 
economic interests in Gaddafi’s Libya. The UNSC did not immediately adopt a resolution that 
legitimised a military intervention but first passed a more symbolic resolution on February 26. 
Resolution 1970 consisted of a demand to end violence, a referral of the case to the 
International Criminal Court, a comprehensive arms embargo, a travel ban and an asset freeze 
for Gaddafi and his family and associates.
64
 
 
Within a few days, it became clear only military force could prevent Benghazi from being 
overrun by Gaddafi’s troops. After increasing calls for a no-fly zone, countries manoeuvred 
for a new resolution, which required nine votes in favour, and the assurance that none of the 
permanent members would use their veto. This was not a foregone conclusion, and early in 
the morning on 17 March 2011 Sarkozy dispatched his Foreign Minister to New York to help 
mobilise votes. To maximize their chances, the drafters had to make sure that the text was a) 
aligned with the R2P-doctrine, b) ruled out the deployment of a foreign occupying force and 
c)  involved  regional  actors  in  the  effort. 
65  
American  contact  with  Russian  President 
Medvedev, who unlike Prime Minister Putin’s faction did not oppose the resolution, ensured a 
Russian abstention rather than veto. To the surprise of France and the UK, Germany indicated 
that it would abstain. The outcome was still uncertain until the very end, with the South 
African delegation awaiting voting instructions from their capital and the Nigerians having 
committed to vote as their South African colleagues would. On 17 March 2011, at 23:36 
hours the vote passed with ten votes in favour and five – Brazil, Germany, India, China and 
Russia  abstaining. 
66   
The  resolution  authorised  member  states  to  take  “all  necessary 
measures(…) to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the 
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Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya”. 67  Just  two  days  later,  French  Rafale fighters  started bombing 
Libyan artillery.
68
 
 
 
3.5 Military planning 
 
On February 25, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the political wing of NATO, held a 
meeting to  discuss the  crisis. 
69  
This meeting brought  together the different ministers of 
Foreign Affairs. Their counterparts from Defence held a meeting on March 10 and 11 which 
paved the way for NATO’s military involvement.70 The first phase of the intervention was 
largely discussed in the ‘Libya Contact Group’ which had been initiated by France in the 
weeks that followed to coordinate the efforts of various governments and organisations. This 
contact  group  included  the  UN,  EU,  NATO,  Arab  League,  Organisation  of  Islamic 
Conference and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States. It not only served as a 
platform to discuss the military part of the intervention, but also as one to discuss support for 
Libya after the intervention.
71 
For France, leading the Contact Group was also a way to keep 
it in its own hands instead of giving the coordination to the NAC.
72 
When the mission was 
transferred to NATO in late March, it could continue the work virtually without any delay 
because its members had already started planning. 
 
 
3.6 Mission objectives & (strategic) narrative 
 
While the mandate of UNSC Resolution 1973 justified “all necessary means”, its objective 
was to protect civilians. There was no reference to regime change or the ousting of Gaddafi as 
this would have elicited a veto from Russia and or China. Thus, the leading intervening 
powers set a narrative of a limited mission. For instance, on March 25, White House Press 
Secretary Jay Carney told reporters that “[w]e are not engaged in military-driven regime 
change” but that they were involved in “time-limited, scope-limited action” to protect the 
Libyan population.
73
 
 
The translation of the political goal and legal mandate to military operations would remain 
difficult throughout the campaign. Resolution 1973, with its focus on the protection of 
civilians, but no mention of an end-state, did not lend itself well to military planning.
74 
On 14 
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April, a month into the intervention, NATO did specify exactly what its objectives for the 
mission would be, stating that military pressure would continue until: 
 
1) All attacks and threats of attack against civilians and civilian-populated areas have ended; 
2) The regime has verifiably withdrawn to bases all military forces, including snipers, 
mercenaries and other para-military forces, including from all populated areas they have 
forcibly entered, occupied or besieged throughout all of Libya, including […] 3) The regime 
must permit immediate, full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all the people in 
Libya in need of assistance.
75
 
 
Nonetheless, the very same day Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy published an Op-Ed in the 
International Herald Tribune that did not dispel the sentiment that regime change was the real 
objective. In the article titled “Libya’s Pathway to Peace”, the three heads of state argued that 
it was “impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Qaddafi in power” and that “[i]n order 
for [that] transition to succeed, Qaddafi must go and go for good”.76 This is, contrary to the 
previously mentioned objective, an end-state that is sufficiently clear and specific for the 
military to act and plan on. 
 
For the United States, there was pressure to scale back its involvement as soon as possible. 
During the lead-up to the mission, one of Obama’s advisors had introduced the term “leading 
from behind” in an interview with The New Yorker.77 However, in the first phase of the 
mission, the US in fact did take a leading role, as was also said by Ivo Daalder, US 
Ambassador to NATO, who called the US role “plain leading”.78 The transfer of the mission 
from  a  US-led  operation  to  a  NATO-led  operation  allowed  a  change  in  narrative,  and 
coincided with the US scaling back its military effort. The mission could thus be transferred 
to NATO in which the US would only play a “supporting role”.79 The image was clear: the 
US successfully attained the mission’s limited objectives and now transferred the authority to 
NATO. A day before Obama’s speech, NATO’s Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
also gave a public statement on NATO’s new role: 
 
NATO Allies have decided to take on the whole military operation in Libya under the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution. Our goal is to protect civilians and civilian- 
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populated areas under threat of attack from the Gaddafi regime. NATO will implement 
all aspects of the UN Resolution. Nothing more, nothing less.
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4 Intervention phase 
 
 
 
 
 
Allied military forces had already been active in Libya before the first air strikes that followed 
on the UN Resolution. As Libya descended into chaos after Gaddafi’s “zenga zenga” speech 
on 22 February 2011, thousands of Western expatriates, predominantly from the oil and gas 
sector, sought to leave the country. Many other nationals, including Chinese, Turks and 
Egyptians, also hastened to leave, resulting in huge traffic jams at several border posts. Each 
European country organised its own non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), sending 
military planes and warships or chartered civilian airliners. There was little or no coordination 
between these different operations.
81 
Tripoli’s airport became clogged with Western planes 
landing to evacuate their own nationals, some leaving with hundreds of people on board and 
others nearly empty. A team of British SAS troops sent to Benghazi to facilitate evacuation 
efforts was arrested by rebels but later released.
82 
A Dutch navy helicopter that tried to pick 
up nationals in Sirte was captured by Gaddafi’s forces; the crew was later also released. At 
sea, several ships including HMS Cumberland took hundreds of evacuees on board. National 
evacuation efforts were initially disorganized and chaotic, and different ministries of Defence 
were tasked to plan and operate in Libya. 
 
The Libyan rebellion had a fast and violent start, but the regime responded equally quickly. 
Around the end of February, the rebels were in control of six of the country’s nine biggest 
cities, and by the high point of the initial uprising insurgents held around half of Libya’s 
populated  territory. 
83  
Regime  forces  launched  an  all-out  counter  attack,  and  with  the 
assistance of tanks and air support all major cities were retaken in the first weeks of March. 
Only Benghazi remained, cut off from supply routes and, being the headquarters of the NTC, 
it was of great military and political importance to the uprising. On 16 March the government 
prepared to assault this last rebel stronghold, with Gaddafi’s son Saif-Al Islam predicting that 
it would all be over in 48 hours.
84 
Without a Western military intervention there is little doubt 
that Benghazi would have fallen. 
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4.1 The air campaign 
 
After resolution 1973 was passed in the night of 17 March, government leaders in Paris, 
London and Washington concluded that direct action was needed to prevent Benghazi from 
falling to government forces. Once again, President Sarkozy took the lead and ordered the 
French air force to prepare strikes. The UK and US also prepared their attacks, with the latter 
informing the French they would launch tomahawk cruise-missiles on the night of 19-20 
March. While the emergency meeting between Allied leaders took place in Paris on 19 
March, Sarkozy informed his counterparts around the table that French jets were at that 
moment underway to execute the first attack against government forces, and that he would 
cancel the strike if they did not support it. Initially both Paris and London had envisaged the 
first strike immediately after the resolution, but this proved technically impossible. Munitions 
needed time for assembly and cruise missiles had to be programmed. The first French strike 
mission did not have a predetermined target, but the pilots were instructed to find targets of 
opportunity – within the rules of engagement – and failing this, to strike a strategic crossroads 
around Benghazi. Two flights of four Rafale and four Mirage jets encountered a battery of 
artillery that was firing on Benghazi, which they destroyed. Instances such as this highlight 
how difficult it would be for political decision-making to keep up with the speed of events.
85
 
 
The initial main target of the allies was  the air defence infrastructure. US  Secretary of 
Defence, one of the sceptics of military intervention, clearly set out what the military 
consequences were of implementing a no-fly zone to protect civilians: “Let’s just call a spade 
a spade. A no fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defences. That’s the 
way you do a no fly zone, and then you can fly planes around the country and not worry about 
our guys being shot down (…) but that is the way it starts”.86 After the initial French air 
strike, the US and UK launched over 200 Tomahawk cruise-missiles, of which around half 
came from the submarine USS Florida (and around 10% from UK assets). Air strikes were 
also launched. Within the first 24 hours Allied strikes reportedly destroyed 22 of 24 of the 
Libyan fixed air defense sites.
87 
After the hand-over to NATO command, around two thirds of 
the bombing sorties were flown by France and the UK, with the rest conducted by Italy, 
Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden (a NATO partner but not member) and Belgium.
88 
The 
United  Arab  Emirates,  Qatar  and  Jordan  also  participated  in  the  campaign,  operating 
alongside the air forces that were their longstanding partners (the US, French and UK air 
forces respectively). The first two countries conducted ground strikes, while the Jordanian Air 
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Force principally conducted air patrol sorties, avoiding combat. Several NATO countries, 
namely the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Turkey also conducted these no fly zone sorties 
but were not involved in attack missions. 
 
After the initial strikes that destroyed Gaddafi’s air defense, command infrastructure and 
advancing columns, the pace of the air strikes slowed. On average, only about 40 to 50 
combat sorties were launched every day (compared to around 1000 daily sorties during the 
high point of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo 1999).
89 
This was in part due to the Gaddafi’s 
forces adapting tactics, and it becoming increasingly difficult for the allies to distinguish 
between rebels and regime fighters. Both sides were often equipped with the same hardware 
and this could moreover change hands back and forth. 
90 
After the first allied air attacks 
destroyed all the known and fixed targets, many missions were flown as “dynamic targeting” 
(rather than “deliberate”), with pilots choosing, identifying and attacking their own targets in 
flight. Combined with the problems of international cooperation and de-conflicting targets, 
this resulted in perhaps as many as 75% of the dynamic targeting sorties flown, for instance 
by France, occurring without a release of weapons.
91 
A reason for such flights was the lack of 
real-time dedicated Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 
(ISTAR)-feeds. 
 
Targets were selected with extreme care. Surgical airstrikes were essential, as collateral 
damage in the form of civilian casualties had to be avoided at all costs. After all, the mission 
was mandated by a UN Resolution specifically aimed at protecting the Libyan civilian 
population, and had to contend with relatively non-committed publics in the intervening 
nations.
92 
While reports do state that there were cases of collateral damage inflicted with 
civilian casualties as a result, the UN recognized that in general “NATO conducted a highly 
precise campaign with a demonstrable determination to avoid civilian casualties”.93 NATO’s 
planners avoided strikes on Libyan oil and gas infrastructure, recognizing the vital importance 
of these assets to Libya’s economy and to the country's future. As a result of considerate 
target selection, basic services such as electricity and water were back running quickly in 
most areas.
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4.2 Military enablers and disablers 
 
The lack of  good strategic and tactical intelligence on  Libya affected all aspects of the 
mission, with the military even having to fall back on Wikipedia and maps dating from the 
Second World War.
95 
The US intelligence community had not considered Libya as a potential 
adversary for years and it was simply seen as a country that was relatively stable.
96 
This view 
of Libya was based on Gaddafi's reconciliation with the West in 2003, and because NATO's 
intelligence community was preoccupied with Afghanistan, investing much of its effort and 
capacity in supporting the ISAF mission. In this theatre, however, many of NATO’s 
intelligence services had learned to cooperate and share data and information in a new and 
complex environment. As the crisis in Libya unfolded, different acquisition platforms were 
tasked to gather information. Important was the first AWACs flight on 6 March, with a 
powerful radar that could map and follow all aerial movements above Libya. Before this date 
it had proven impossible, bar an attack filmed on TV, to confirm whether Gaddafi’s planes 
were  actually attacking ground  targets. 
97  
While the  intervention would  be  based  on  the 
premise of Gaddafi using indiscriminate violence against his own civilians, the veracity of 
information on his actions would remain difficult to judge without good intelligence. 
 
As contingency planning for a military intervention started, Allied forces realised that their 
information on Gaddafi’s military was also hopelessly out-of-date. Tables of the numbers of 
planes, tanks and ships were available, but no-one knew whether the military equipment had 
been properly maintained and if it could still function. Other aspects, such as the composition, 
professionalism, loyalty and morale of the armed forces were equally difficult to judge.
98 
Was 
Gaddafi’s militarized society, armed with large stockpiles of Soviet weapons one big 
“Potemkin village”? During February and March the intelligence services of France, the UK 
and the US quickly diverted much capacity, technical and human, in the field of acquisition 
and analysis from other teams to Libya. However, the generation of a good intelligence 
picture is a process that requires time. The creation of a network of reliable and valuable 
human sources takes months if not years. Although technically signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
capacity can be brought to bear on the target much faster, to fully exploit the acquired data 
enough native speakers need to be recruited. This process in every country is coupled with a 
lengthy security screening, which also takes months. For the analysts responsible with 
combining the data and producing the strategic and political analyses, knowledge of the local 
language, culture and history is also vital. This was evidently lacking and would negatively 
impact on the quality of reports that was provided to decision-makers. 
 
Intelligence sharing between international partners remained a problem throughout the 
campaign. Although NATO allies had greatly improved intelligence sharing mechanisms and 
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mutual trust during the ISAF-mission in Afghanistan
99
, most collaborations during the Libya 
campaign were still ad hoc. While the Dutch were allowed into the Five Eyes intelligence 
alliance during their tenure as lead-nation in Uruzgan, Afghanistan (albeit temporarily, and 
confined to certain topics), France did not manage to secure a similar status for the Libya 
intervention.
100 
A request for access to the Five Eyes was made through the French Defense 
attaché in Washington, but to no avail.
101 
As a result of such denials many analyses, and 
especially raw intelligence such as SIGINT, did not reach the non-Anglo-Saxon partners. 
Conversely, while France did seek to maximize the sharing of its own intelligence, the limited 
capacity within its intelligence services to ensure timely translation into English meant that 
even though reports were disseminated internationally, they could not always be used. 
 
Once the mission had become a NATO one, decision-making generally circumvented the 
political  and  the  slow  process  of  the  North  Atlantic  Council  (NAC).  French  and  UK 
permanent representatives to NATO would regularly first meet bilaterally, then align with the 
other eight allied countries participating in strike operations to ensure that an agreed position 
was established before it was presented to the other NATO ambassadors. The aerial campaign 
plan could thus be compiled with a relatively large freedom of movement by the Allied Air 
Component Commander, Lieutenant General Ralf Jodice. Nonetheless, France as well as the 
UK retained operational discretion over their own military assets.
102 
While the air component 
of the campaign was coordinated and led in a multilateral fashion, the ground component was 
not. Special Forces from France and the UK, as well as extensive Qatari involvement on the 
ground, remained outside this structure. 
 
The whole operation was planned in an extremely short time-span, with contingency planning 
starting only three weeks before the actual strikes would take place. This was an extraordinary 
feat of staff planning, considering that for example the planning of Allied Force (although 
also with a land component) took months longer. While at the political level the US was still 
unsure whether to intervene militarily, it apparently nudged the alliance to start planning for 
the eventuality of a military intervention. On 3 March 2011 NATO’s  Secretary General 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that while NATO had no intention to intervene, the alliance 
always  took  prudent  planning  for  all  eventualities. 
103  
If  NATO  allies  had  not  started 
contingency planning early in March, they probably would not have been able and ready to 
launch the attacks when Benghazi threatened to fall. 
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From a military perspective, the lessons identified were not new. Some of the most important 
conclusions were summarized in an Anglo-French summit, held in February 2012, on the first 
anniversary of the Libyan revolt. The joint declaration stated: “following an analysis of 
lessons identified, we have decided to prioritize our joint work in the key areas of command 
and control; information systems; intelligence; surveillance; targeting and reconnaissance; and 
precision munitions”.104 The shortfall in capabilities in these specific fields, specifically on 
the European side of the Alliance, was however not surprising. The exact same shortfalls had 
been identified after NATO’s Allied Force air campaign in Kosovo (1999), but a decade of 
Defense cuts in Europe further exacerbated the military capability gap with the US.
105
 
 
 
4.3 Rebels versus Regime 
 
Although elements of Gaddafi’s military had obtained prior combat experience in for instance 
Chad, the Libyan army had not previously been used to crush riots and was confronted by a 
new challenge. Having come to power through a coup himself, Gaddafi was aware of the 
potential power of the military to challenge his authority and thus coop-proofed it as much as 
he could during his rule. Through family and tribal appointments, the loyalty of several units 
was assured, yet this tactic simultaneously also undermined the cohesion of the regular army 
(to prevent coups).
106 
This would result in a high desertion rate during the uprising and the 
war against NATO. In the first month of the uprising, reportedly 8.000 of the original 52.000 
strong  army  deserted,  a  trend  that  continued  throughout  the  conflict. 
107  
The  deserters 
consisted of individuals from rank and file (not the officers), and most did not join the 
opposition. Some exceptions were formed by whole units switching sides, most prominently 
one following general Abdel Fattah Younis. He became the commander in chief of the rebels’ 
national liberation army, until he was assassinated in July 2011. While these troops were well 
trained and equipped and proved their worth in battle, there was much distrust between the 
rebels and defectors. Also, lack of trust and cohesion within the rebels’ forces led to the 
mushrooming of militias based on interests, both regional and ideological. 
 
A rebel victory was not a foregone conclusion. A nucleus of Gaddafi loyalists would fiercely 
resist the rebels until the end, and were concentrated around the 32
nd 
Brigade, which consisted 
of around 10.000 troops commanded by Gaddafi’s son Khamis. They were initially sent to 
quell the revolt in Benghazi, were successively responsible for the assault on Misrata, and 
then organized the last stand around Tripoli. Fighters from this unit committed considerable 
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human rights abuses, including indiscriminate violence against civilians, torture and arbitrary 
executions.
108 
The regime also used mercenaries from Sub-Saharan Africa to complement the 
army, and they were offered large salaries to fight the insurgency. Their involvement in the 
conflict and their disregard for civilian life alienated large segments of the population and the 
military.
109
 
 
To support and advise the rebels, several intervening countries sent small teams of military 
advisors  to  assist  the  NTC.  The  intervening  powers  argued  that  these  Special  Forces 
operations did not conflict with Resolution 1973, which explicitly rules out “occupying 
powers”. In compliance with the transparency clause of UN resolution 1970, the US, UK, 
France and Italy notified the committee that they intended to deliver military related material 
or personnel to Libya. Providing arms to rebels would, however, technically conflict with the 
arms-embargo (that forbade delivery of arms and ammunition to all parties in the conflict), 
but here the allies used a rather artificial distinction between self-defense weapons and those 
that were not (of a larger calibre than for example the Milan anti-tank missiles provided to the 
rebels). According to some accounts, more than 40  tons of  arms and ammunition were 
delivered by Qatar, with France also parachuting weapons to the rebels.
110 
Both countries did 
not provide further information on the number and nature of the weapons delivered, even 
when pressed by a UN panel of experts to do so.
111
 
 
Qatar played a significant role in supporting the rebels, through financial aid, delivery of arms 
shipments and advisors on the ground. Qatari Chief of Staff Major General Hamad bin Ali al- 
Atiya admitted that he had hundreds of boots on the ground. They provided training and 
communication and acted as the link between the rebels and NATO forces. During a meeting 
in Doha in October 2011, Libya’s interim leader Mustafa Abdel Jalil confirmed the strong 
Qatari role, saying that they had been “a major partner in all the battles we fought.”112 Qatar’s 
active role in Unified Protector – and the ensuing positive coverage of the conflict by state 
owned Al Jazeera – was a welcome contribution to the NATO coalition. This overt Qatari 
position and policy stood in contrast to allegations of its generous financial support to radical 
Salafi groups in the broader region, some of which have turned to violence to further their 
goals.
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During the first months progress by the rebels was slow. The initial arms shipments were vital 
to sustain their momentum, and air strikes continued to wear down Gaddafi loyalists. 
Nonetheless, in June there was still little prospective of an immediate rebel victory, exhorting 
NATO to extend the military campaign for another 90 days. During the same timeframe, 
several peace overtures or proposals for a ceasefire by Gaddafi did not come to fruition.
114
 
More and more countries recognized the NTC as the legitimate representative body of Libya 
and on 9 June 2011, during the third international meeting of the Contact Group, Western and 
Arab states pledged more than $1.3 billion in aid to the rebel forces.
115 
In September, as rebel 
forces closed in on the last regime strongholds in Tripoli and Sirte, the NTC published its 
road  map  for  transition  (see  4.).  Finally  on  20  October  Gaddafi  was  captured  and 
subsequently killed by rebels as he attempted to flee Sirte. Three days later, nearly eight 
months after the start of the uprising, the NTC proclaimed the liberation of the country. 
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5 Transition Phase 
 
 
 
 
 
By his often quoted statement “if you break it you own it”, Collin Powell referred to the fact 
that “when you take out a regime and you bring down a government, you become the 
government”.116 While this may have been the case in Iraq, it was not in Libya, with the NTC 
in line to govern the country after the ‘liberation’ from Gaddafi. After the initial French 
recognition of the NTC as the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people on 10 
March, many other countries followed suit. Even Russia, critical of NATO’s intervention 
from the start, recognized the NTC as the legitimate government of Libya on 1 September 
2011, before Gaddafi was found and killed.
117 
The NTC was set to take ‘ownership’ of the 
challenging post-conflict situation, and planning for the transition began while the outcome of 
the  war  was  still  uncertain.  Already  in  August,  however,  a  US  State  Department 
representative  present  on  the  ground  felt  that  the  NTC  officials  were  “observers  and 
chroniclers rather than the authors of the unfolding developments to the west.”118 His analysis 
emphasised an NTC that was passive and hardly in control of events, and that would have to 
work hard to nurture its legitimacy and authority to prevent a political vacuum after the fall of 
Tripoli. 
 
During military operations, political planning for the transition took stock. The UK chose a 
novel approach that was meant to heed the lessons learned from Iraq. In May 2011 it deployed 
its first “International Stabilisation Response Team” (ISRT) to Libya, sending eleven experts 
from different fields such as security, economics, infrastructure, essential public services and 
justice, to assess Libya's future requirements. The recently completed “Strategic Defence and 
Security Review” introduced these integrated teams as a new concept, one offering a “whole 
of  government  approach”. 119   The  product  of  this  team  was  a  detailed  “stabilisation 
document”, overseen by the Department for International Development, that set out possible 
priorities for the NTC after the cessation of conflict (the removal of the Gaddafi regime). 
While the report offered sound advice in many areas, it was essentially focused on prioritizing 
short-term actions, categorized in “Immediate Phase”, “Early Phase” and “Interim Phase”, 
with a lesser emphasis on the last phase (actions between thirty days and six months to the 
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gap of longer term recovery).
120 
However, it was only after the successful elections in July 
2012 that the transition began to falter seriously. 
 
Directly after the intervention there was optimism in Western countries, as well as in Libya 
itself. In contrast to the transition in Iraq nearly ten years earlier, there was no chaos, no 
looting; there was a return to daily life. The proponents of the “light footprint” seemed to be 
vindicated. The argument to keep the international involvement limited was succinctly 
summarized by Rory Stewart, who had extensive experience in Iraq and Afghanistan: 
 
And a powerful international lobby will urge the West to ‘solve these problems’: to 
send thousands of consultants under the slogans of ‘state-building’ and ‘capacity- 
building’, or even to send our troops for ‘stabilisation’. That we must resist. There is a 
real limit to how much the West knows about Libya, still less to how much we can do 
to fix fundamental structural problems if they emerge. Meanwhile, Libya is not a 
threat to its people or its neighbours. Too many Western ‘advisers’ risk making things 
worse: making the government appear like a foreign puppet; stirring Islamist 
resentment; raising expectations we cannot meet. We would soon be trapped by our 
guilt at lost lives, and deter Libyans from taking responsibility for their own future – 
to their detriment and ours. In Libya, as in much of the world, when it comes to 
foreign involvement: less is more.
121
 
 
As the 2012 RAND-report “Libya’s Post Gaddafi’s transition” succinctly formulates, 
insecurity has a tendency to become self-perpetuating: “The sine qua non of post-conflict 
reconstruction is that without security, all other necessary nation-building and state-building 
tasks become nearly impossible. Security spirals downward as mutual suspicion intensifies, 
the security dilemma deepens, political reform and constitution-making become hopelessly 
entangled with military developments, and economic recovery slows (and eventually reverses) 
as capital flees the country”.122 Analysing the past five half-yearly reports by the UN on the 
situation in Libya, the progressive deterioration of the security situation becomes clear. After 
the attack that killed US ambassador Stevens in 2012, security precautions were significantly 
increased. Many other international and diplomatic representatives survived “near misses”, 
but as open fighting broke out in the streets most international offices were evacuated or 
closed. In summer 2014 the EU Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM 
Libya) was forced to relocate to Tunisia, while UNSMIL also relocated the majority of its 
staff. With no boots on the ground to protect the outlets of international aid and assistance, 
security concerns effectively curtailed their work. 
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5.1 The time-line: descent into chaos 
 
After the NTC proclaimed the “liberation” of Libya, the process indicated by the road map for 
transition was started. The NTC formed an interim government led by Prime Minister 
Abdurrahim El Keiband and planned national elections for a constitutional assembly within 
eight months. Although in the subsequent months there were large protests against the 
unelected  NTC  and  its  perceived  ineffectiveness,  elections  were  held  on  7  July  2012. 
Although they were conducted in an orderly fashion, there were no mechanisms in place to 
ensure the rule of law, placing the inexperienced and fragile government – without a 
functioning bureaucracy - in a position where it would almost certainly fail. There is therefore 
a case for not hastening elections, and postponing them until an incoming government would 
have  the  capacity  to  succeed. 
123  
A  200-member  interim  parliament,  called  the  General 
National Congress (GNC) was elected, with a coalition of liberal parties led by Mahmoud 
Jirbil, one of the leaders of the 2011 rebellion, emerging as victor. The Islamic parties, such as 
the Muslim Brotherhood did not fare well in the elections. One of the main tasks of the GNC 
was to establish a Constitution within an 18-month deadline, after which the GNC would 
expire and be replaced by a Council of Deputies or House of Representatives (HoR), to be 
elected in June 2014. The deadline on the Constitution was not met, and after the second 
election a significant rupture appeared in the institutional landscape. 
 
Two competing alliances of tribes and militias are at the heart of Libya’s post-intervention 
strife. One side is composed of Arab nationalists and federalists who coordinate their actions 
against Islamists from their power base in the East. Led by general Khalifa Haftar, they 
launched Operation Libya Dignity in May 2014 against opponents in Benghazi and Tripoli. 
Although much of Libya’s official army backed Haftar, it is not clear to what extent the 
civilian HoR stands behind his actions and decisions. He does, however, receive significant 
backing from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
124 
On the other side a loose 
coalition of Islamists, consisting of Libya Shield and Misrata militias with the support of 
Amazigh (Berber) tribes, have combined forces in Operation Libya Dawn. Factions within 
Libya Dawn in turn receive support and assistance from countries that are supportive of 
political Islam, including Qatar, Turkey and Sudan. As with Syria, international involvement 
on both sides of a civil conflict is complicating efforts to resolve the conflict. 
 
The deadlock between these factions crippled Libya’s nascent political institutions. The 
elections in 25 June 2014 for the House of Representatives illustrated the public’s disaffection 
and loss of trust with a turnout of 45%, dropping from more than 60% in 2012. Nonetheless, 
the electoral gains of the different Islamist factions were again marginal. To compensate their 
electoral losses and in response to Operation Dignity, they launched their own offensive in 
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August. After violent street combat and the use of heavy weapons, the Islamist coalition 
(Operation Dawn) managed to take control of Tripoli and its (destroyed) international airport. 
The government aligned Zintan militias were defeated and the recently elected House of 
Representatives was forced to relocate to Tobruk in the East of Libya as convening in 
Benghazi was deemed unsafe. The fighting caused more than 100.000 to flee Tripoli. 
125
 
Operation Dawn resurrected the General National Congress and proceeded to form a parallel 
government. Adding to the political turmoil, in November Libya’s Supreme Court ruled that 
the internationally recognized House of Representatives was unconstitutional and therefore 
illegal. Since the court resides in Tripoli, which is firmly under control of the Islamist militias, 
the  government  in  Tobruk  rejected  the  ruling,  claiming  that  the  decision  was  taken  at 
gunpoint.
126 
Now two competing executives as well as legislative institutions exist in Tobruk 
and Tripoli, while real power lies with the different armed militias. 
 
UN Special Envoy Bernardino Leon went to great lengths trying to mediate between the 
different factions. In October 2015, he announced the formation of a national unity 
government, aiming to bridge the divide between the different factions.
127 
In February 2016, 
the composition of this new government was announced. Some are optimistic about this 
development.  However,  the  legitimacy  of  this  government  is  seriously  questioned  as 
hardliners on both sides do not accept it.
128
 
 
 
5.2 Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration 
 
Despite early recognition that disarmament and demobilization of the militias was of vital 
importance to security and stability in Libya, little has been achieved on this front. Initial 
efforts supported by the UN focused on a body called the Warrior Affairs Commission of 
Rehabilitation and Development that sought to register former combatants to assist them in 
finding employment. It was overwhelmed by applicants whose antecedents could, of course, 
not be verified. The Ministry of Defence also has problems in integrating former fighters as it 
was regarded with mistrust by the rebels. Some armed groups were involved in lucrative 
criminal activities and would therefore not surrender their weapons and others were aligned 
with radical Islamist factions. In addition, various government officials also sought to protect 
militias  aligned  with  them,  signaling  a  lack  of  commitment  to  demobilization  and 
reintegration.
129 
In general, many groups were distrustful of the government and hedged on 
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the ability to provide their own security. Instrumental to the lack of progress in disarming the 
groups is the absence of a central institution that has enough power to force other actors to 
comply. A lack of sufficient security assurance translates into no incentives for the tribes to 
surrender arms.
130 
Consequently, the NTC order that all militias must disarm by 31 December 
2011 was ignored completely. 
 
According to the UN panel of experts on Libya, the proliferation of arms and ammunition 
during the conflict was enormous. This has considerably contributed to fuelling pre-existing 
sources of insecurity in the country and broader region: “The conflict in Libya witnessed the 
loss of national control over military materiel and a complete redistribution of weapons 
ownership in the country. The distribution of weapons to civilians, the appropriation of the 
contents of depots by individuals and brigades, coupled with additional military materiel that 
entered Libya from elsewhere, resulted in the uncontrolled circulation of very large quantities 
of arms and ammunition during the conflict.”131 This arms bonanza has not only benefited 
smugglers and terrorists, but it also further empowered the militias. 
 
Rather than integrating individual militia fighters into the security forces, the competing state 
actors effectively tried to co-opt and integrate whole militias – armed and well – into the state. 
According to Jeursen and Van den Bergh, those fighters who registered as (former) militia 
members received benefits of 1,500 to 2,500  euro and were recognised as  “brigade” or 
“katiba” instead of just “militia”. 132  Unsurprisingly, this led to many citizens registering 
themselves as militia members: approximately 20,000 fighters were active during the 
revolution but 200,000 received money for their self-proclaimed fighting efforts.
133 
The net 
result was a further empowerment of these militias, who in many cases were supposedly 
aligned with the government but actually fought against the state. During the war the rebel 
factions were never unified in one single army, and after the rebellion they kept their separate 
status, weapons and local power-bases. The disappearance of Gaddafi’s repressive security 
apparatus has allowed old ethnic and tribal conflicts to flare up, as well as intensified 
competition for land and/or smuggling routes. 
 
 
5.3 Building government capacity 
 
As a result of Gaddafi’s personal rule of Libya, there were no functioning institutions present 
to support the transition. An elaborate divide and rule policy prevented any institutional 
capacity from developing and forming a potential threat to Gaddafi’s rule. The military was, 
as mentioned earlier, “coup proofed” and extensively weakened in the process; the same also 
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applied to other departments such as justice and economic affairs.
134 
The rebels were thus 
destined to inherit a state without central institutions, a functioning bureaucracy, an 
independent security apparatus, nor effective political parties or an active civil society. The 
lack of a trained civil service and the absence of institutions to organise the provision of basic 
state services has been compounded by a brain drain after the civil war and physical 
destruction suffered during the ensuing conflict. Also, the adoption of the controversial 
“Political Isolation Law” (PIL) in 2013 “disqualified anyone involved in Muammar Qaddafi’s 
regime from the new administration, armed forces and other [state] entities”.135 This meant 
that capable individuals were excluded from taking on important posts that had to be filled. 
 
Progress in the area of Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been lacking and there is no unified, 
strong military. The core of the new armed forces is formed by the National Liberation Army 
(NLA), that mainly consists of eastern units that defected from Gaddafi’s military during the 
revolution. Its history and composition thus hamper its legitimacy. A lack of capable police 
forces, coupled with the insecurity caused by militia’s fighting each other, has led to a culture 
of impunity and general lawlessness in many areas. Crime rates have soared, reflected in the 
increasing numbers of kidnappings, armed robberies and hijacking of vehicles. Campaigns of 
targeted assassinations against judges and prosecutors have resulted in a complete absence of 
the rule of law in Benghazi and other regions.
136 
This has seriously impacted on the ability of 
the government to provide basic services, and thus its legitimacy in the eyes of the population. 
Detainees, many from the rebellion, are mistreated or tortured in the country’s prisons while 
mass break-outs have also occurred. 
 
In Libya, SSR was not given priority either in support of the revolution nor immediately after, 
and only took prominence after the elections. With on the one hand a ‘light footprint’ mission, 
and on the other a weak or absent national leadership, there was no will and capacity to tackle 
the difficult security issues. While UNSMIL did provide carrots to entice cooperation of local 
actors, there was no ‘stick’ to ensure that outliers also conformed to policy. UNSMIL thus 
provided considerable advice to the Libyan government on SSR, but almost all was ignored 
and the mission had no capacity – or mandate – to enforce anything.137 As a result, security 
waned in 2012-2013, and totally collapsed in 2014. 
 
An effective management of the country’s significant oil and gas industry is essential for the 
economy and the government’s revenue. Gaddafi’s power-base relied on the hydrocarbon 
industry to subsidize fuel and food but mismanagement and underinvestment has crippled the 
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state-owned sector. In 2012, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), spending 
on wages and subsidies increased enormously, putting an added strain on Libya’s fiscal 
sustainability.
138 
While ideally the government would have worked on improving efficiency 
in the oil and gas sector, limiting corruption and nepotism, and attracting foreign investment, 
in  reality  even  keeping  physical  control  of  the  installations  has  become  an  enormous 
challenge.  During  the  course  of  2013/2014  armed  groups  or  unarmed  demonstrations 
disrupted many of the country’s oil fields, terminals, refineries and pipelines with political or 
financial demands. As a result, output dropped at times to as low as 150.000 barrels a day, 
less than a tenth of peak capacity (and pre-war levels).
139 
While output has slightly recovered 
since, it is still significantly less than its potential. The combination of rising expenditures and 
feeble oil revenues seriously threaten government finances. 
 
Transitional justice is vital to heal the rifts after forty-two years of dictatorship and the bloody 
civil war that followed in 2011. Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non- 
judicial measures that are implemented to  redress the legacies of massive human rights 
abuses. This contributes to achieving justice in times of transition from conflict and state 
repression. In Libya, the process of national reconciliation and the building of public trust 
have been hindered by an absence of political agreement and reconciliation, and the lacking 
security situation. There are competing narratives about who should be included in 
reconciliation and trust building exercises. Different, competing “dialogue committees” were 
set up  in 2013 and 2014,  all without much success. 
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A priori, consensus is necessary 
between the main political parties on how the state and its institutions should be managed, and 
subsequently grievances of specific ethnic and tribal groups will need to be addressed.
141
 
 
 
5.4 International community 
 
By adopting a “light footprint” at the start of the military intervention, there was little 
perspective of adopting a heavier footprint during transition. Almost immediately after the 
death of Gaddafi NATO ended the military operation Unified Protector. The NTC, however, 
requested NATO to continue military operations, and provide military advisers on the ground 
to counter any attacks by remnants of regime forces and to secure the border. This was turned 
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down by the Alliance.
142 
Nonetheless, the NTC leadership also sent mixed messages to the 
international community, rejecting the idea of any kind of international force on Libyan 
soil.
143 
The absence of demand on the ground for an international force coincided with a clear 
lack of political will on the supply side. The war in Afghanistan and Iraq arguably highlighted 
the risk of embroilment to the Western public and President Obama was in the midst of 
extricating troops from Iraq. 
 
The European Union (EU) committed € 80,5 million in humanitarian assistance and € 130 
million in technical assistance for SSR, public administration, civil society, education and 
democratic transition. Democratic governance, youth and health were singled out as priority 
areas for 2014-2015.
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But as the security situation deteriorated, these programs faltered. 
Coordination between the efforts of different member states was limited, with the larger 
countries each appointing their own Libya envoy. National interests, from advancing their 
own oil and gas industry or promoting arms-sales to the new government, complicated an 
already complex area of foreign policy, whereas consensus is needed for any EU standpoint. 
 
 
5.5 Terrorism and counterterrorism 
 
There have been some attempts to invest in Libya’s counterterrorism capabilities. These 
efforts did not start immediately after the end of the military intervention, but were launched 
after the death of US Ambassador Christopher Stevens in September 2012.
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The main effort 
to invest in Libya’s counterterrorism capabilities was spearheaded by the US. Around the end 
of 2012, the US Special Operations Forces set up a mission to train the 22
nd  
Libyan Special 
Operations Forces, based in “Camp 27” or “Camp Younis” just outside of Tripoli.146 The US 
Department  of  Defense  invested  $16  million  via  a  Special  Operations  Support  (SOF) 
company and medical training program. 
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This Libyan battalion consisted of around 700 
soldiers that had to be trained. None of the troops came from Misrata, and only a handful of 
soldiers originated from Benghazi, both important strongholds during the 2011 uprising. This 
led to suspicion in the camps of more Islamist-oriented parties who feared the force was 
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secretly trained to fight them.
148 
In the summer of 2013, after a raid on the camp, the US 
terminated the mission and withdrew the military trainers. 
149 
The objective of conducting 
joint operations with the trained Libyans was never reached, and the training location was 
taken over in April 2014 by a warring faction led by a former associate of Osama bin 
Laden.
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6 Results/outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Regional implications 
 
A major unintended consequence of the Libya intervention was the crisis in Mali that erupted 
months after the fall of Gaddafi. Thousands of Tuaregs who served in Gaddafi’s Islamic 
legion found themselves out of work and returned to Mali in the last months of 2011. They 
travelled through Niger and probably Algeria in large convoys of pick-ups, taking their 
weapons with them.
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The “Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l’Azawad” (MNLA) 
was formed in November, and in January 2012 the Tuaregs launched a rebellion in the North. 
As with the previous three rebellions since independence, the nomadic Tuaregs claimed more 
autonomy (or independence) from the central government in Bamako. Forming an alliance of 
convenience with the terrorist groups of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and two 
other jihadist groups, the Tuareg separatists outgunned and outfought the Malian army. 
Frustrated with the lack of government support for the military, a group of junior army 
officers launched a mutiny on 22 March 2012. This quickly turned into a coup as the edifice 
of a corrupt and hollow regime collapsed. Ironically, the flight of the incumbent President 
ATT and the ensuing political chaos in Bamako only accelerated the Tuareg advance in the 
North. By April 2012 two thirds of Malian territory was wrested from government control, 
although the secular Tuareg separatist immediately saw their own uprising hijacked by the 
jihadist groups. By July the North of Mali was a large terrorist safe-haven, imposing sharia 
law and attracting foreign fighters from the broader region (see the Mali report). 
 
The collapse of Mali over the course of a few months also took the international community 
by surprise. Mali had been a ‘donor darling’ for the West and had enjoyed uninterrupted 
democratic  elections  since  1991;  a  rare  case  in  a  region  where  coups  and  military 
dictatorships were rife. Although the well-armed Tuareg returnees provided the spark that lit 
the  fire,  the  causes  of  the  Malian  crisis  were  of  course  deeper  and  more  complex. 
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Nonetheless, the seemingly repetitive question of why no-one saw the crisis coming needs to 
be asked. Were experts on sub-Saharan Africa consulted before and during the intervention in 
Libya? Algeria, Mali, Niger and the African Union were vocal in their opposition to the 
intervention in Libya. Gaddafi was after all, one of the Union’s larger investors and the major 
bankroller  of  certain  African  regimes.  But  the  potential  consequences  on  the  Sahel  of 
removing  Gaddafi  from  power  were  not  considered  in  Western  capitals.  One  possible 
explanation could  be  the  institutional organisation  of  all  Western  Ministries of  Foreign 
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Affairs. For historical reasons, the regional departments combine and cluster North African 
(Maghreb) countries with the Middle East. The sub-Saharan countries are covered by a 
separate department, that is often more closely aligned to the development aid 
directorate/department. The business and academic world incidentally applies a similar 
division with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and as with the diplomatic 
world, experts tend to circulate within these delineated domains. It is possible that this 
organisational divide contributed to the West not realising the potential consequences of 
intervening in Libya on sub Saharan Africa, but more research is needed on this topic. 
 
The interconnectedness of Libya in the Sahel has broader implications. Just as Gaddafi’s 
overthrow was a catalyst for the 2012 crisis in Mali, the French intervention in 2013 
(Operation Serval), with the finality of removing the jihadists from Northern Mali, also had 
consequences for Libya. As French and Chadian forces cleared the north, jihadist groups 
either dissolved into the population, organised a last stand (which they lost) or fled over the 
porous  borders.  One  of  the  more  infamous  regional  terrorist  commanders,  Mokhtar 
Belmoktar, launched his attack on an Algerian gas installation in January 2013 from Libyan 
territory.
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As AQIM and other terrorist groups lost their freedom of movement in Northern 
Mali, the lawlessness of southern Libya coupled with old alliances offered an ideal new “safe 
haven”. On 13 June 2015 a US airstrike unsuccessfully targeted Belmokhtar who was hiding 
in Libya, and French counterterrorist operations have interdicted several jihadist convoys 
originating from Libya and traversing Niger. For Libya, the presence of these violent groups 
with their links to the international drugs trade further contributes to the downward spiral of 
insecurity and instability. 
 
 
6.2 The United Nations 
 
The UNSMIL mission takes a central position in rebuilding post-revolutionary Libya. In 
September 2011, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2009 that mandated the UNSMIL for a period 
of three months. The mandate has been extended several times, most recently in March 2014. 
It tasked the UNSMIL, headquartered in Tripoli, to support the Libyan government to: 
 
1)  (…) Ensure the transition to democracy 
2)  Promote the rule of law and monitor and protect human rights 
3)  Control  unsecured  arms  and  related  materiel  in  Libya  and  counter  their 
proliferation 
4)  Build [Libyan] governance capacity.
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Bernardino Léon, heading the mission since September 2014, summarized the main problems 
faced by UNSMIL in May 2015 as follows: 
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]The main problems are] its weak and fragmented State institutions, their current 
political polarization, the predominance of armed groups seemingly oblivious to the 
national interest, media incitement and inflammatory rhetoric, and corruption. These 
are all factors that have contributed to the current breakdown of basic State functions 
and the disruption of the country’s economy and of its social fabric.155 
 
The increasing presence of terrorist elements in Libya adds to the complexity of the situation. 
The beheadings of 21 Egyptian Copts by the Islamic State (IS) in December 2014 and January 
2015 provoked an Egyptian military response. Shifting fortunes on the battlefields of Iraq and 
Syria have led IS to invest more in Libya. Yet various attempts by UNSMIL to end the 
political deadlock have had only limited success. In June 2015, the House of Representatives 
rejected the latest and what was meant to be final draft of a peace settlement.
156 
One of the 
criticisms towards UNSMIL is that it heavily relied on contacts with the political elite in 
Tripoli. To avoid this, it should “engage with key groups and players on the local level, and 
widen their information and communication base”.157 
 
As a direct consequence of insecurity in Libya, a UN strategic assessment of UNSMIL in 
March 2015 proposed a reduction in size of the mission.
158 
Many staff had already been 
relocated outside Libya. UNSMIL will also focus on human rights monitoring and reporting, 
supporting key Libyan institutions such as the Constitutional Drafting Assembly, the Central 
Bank and the electoral commission. Although initially reticent to host any foreign presence, as 
the crisis deepened the Libyan authorities have become more outspoken in their request for 
international assistance. This move was not without criticism in and outside Libya. In a UN 
Security Council meeting on the escalating situation in Libya in February 2015, the Libyan 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  International  Cooperation  commented  on  the  increased 
presence of the Islamic State in the country, arguing that the international community had a 
legal  and  moral  responsibility  to  help  rebuild  and  rearm  the  Libyan  armed  forces. 
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Nonetheless, the role of the Libyan authorities was also criticized, with the UN Secretary 
General in 2014 stating that actors within Libya lack the “sustained political will and efforts 
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necessary to promote an effective and inclusive security dialogue and to generate the 
consensus needed for true national ownership to reform the security sector”.160 
 
This view on the difficulty of security sector reform in Libya is shared by the authors of the 
RAND report. They state that “[a]s with disarmament, the Libyan government lacks the 
legitimacy,   bandwidth,   and   know-how   necessary   for   comprehensive  security   sector 
reform”.161 In their eyes, the presence of NATO advisors immediately after the conflict would 
have helped: “A deeper engagement with Libya (in the form of a training mission, for 
example) would provide Libya with expertise that it needs on multiple levels as it goes about 
reforming and rebuilding its security sector”.162 Special focus should be paid to establishing a 
monopoly of force, and the authors argue that a larger role for NATO in Libya could in fact 
avoid the necessity of deploying ground troops, something that is neither preferred by most 
Libyans nor by NATO.
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7 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast to Afghanistan and Mali, the intervention in Libya was not a response to a terrorist 
threat. Swept along in the events that were optimistically billed as the ‘Arab Spring’, the 
arrest of a Libyan human rights activist in February 2011 provided the local trigger for the 
uprising against Gadaffi. With France initially caught wrong footed in Tunisia, by offering to 
support autocrat Ben Ali before he was swept from power by popular indignation, President 
Sarkozy was determined to be on the right side of history in Libya. He took a pivotal role in 
rallying Western support for the rebels, and his initiatives shaped the first actions of the 
intervention. When the uprising faltered early March 2011, and Gadaffi threatened to hunt 
down protestors inch by inch, alleyway by alleyway in their last redoubt at Benghazi, the US, 
France and the UK mobilized support to prevent another ‘Srebrenica’ or ‘Rwanda’. 
Advocating the R2P doctrine, and with support from the Arab states, Resolution 1973 was 
passed on 17 March 2011, establishing a no-fly zone over Libya. Almost immediately French, 
British and US planes bombed the Libyan air-defence infrastructure, and subsequently any 
military targets they could find. The military intervention initially consisted of separate US, 
French and British operations, but by the end of March NATO took full command of all 
operations under Operation Unified Protector. It would be a light footprint intervention, not 
only because China and Russia would have vetoed anything that smelled of regime change, 
but Western powers had also, they thought, learned the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Large numbers of deployed troops had not been a recipe for success, and public opinion was 
certainly not supportive of another intensive and costly ground mission. The intervention 
therefore consisted of a small sea-borne element, a large international air force, but just a few 
covert Special Forces and advisors, especially from Qatar, on the ground. The fighting would 
have to be done by the rebels themselves. 
 
The decision-making procedure was characterized by extreme haste, a lack of intelligence and 
unclear strategic objectives. Gaddafi had not been considered a threat to the West after his 
rapprochement in 2003, and there was both a lack of military intelligence and understanding 
of the political and cultural landscape in Libya. While the mission had been explained in 
terms  of  protecting  civilians  and  not  implementing  regime  change,  the  goal  was  still 
effectively the latter as it was estimated that with Gaddafi in power, civilians would not be 
safe. A negotiated settlement with Gaddafi was therefore not on the cards, and with the US 
content to ‘lead from behind’, and Germany and other allies remaining passive, a single 
coherent narrative was absent. In Libya, opposition to Gaddafi was nominally united under 
the umbrella of the NTC, but in practice it consisted of different factions running different 
uprisings. During the summer months the first signals reached allied governments that the 
NTC was not so much the architect of the revolution as its witness, but the primary concern 
was slow progress on the ground against Gaddafi’s troops. Planning for the phase after the 
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military victory was limited, although the UK’s deployment of a multi-disciplinary transition 
team seemed a new and original concept to prepare for the next phase. When Sirte finally fell 
and Gaddafi was killed at the end of October 2011, NATO was keen to close the operation a 
week later. If the objective was protecting civilians, this ceased the moment Gaddafi died. 
What had been a light footprint intervention would only become lighter, as both the Libyan 
NTC and NATO were not keen on troops on Libyan soil. 
 
The first months of the transition were relatively quiet, allowing optimists to hail NATO’s 
military intervention as a model for future military operations. In December the NTC deadline 
to the militias to disarm passed by unnoticed, and all preparations were focussed on the 
elections for the General National Congress in the summer. The NTC lacked capacity to 
enforce the disarmament of the militias, and when they refused to do so they were 
subsequently paid to keep a semblance of order on the streets. They were later integrated in 
Libya’s security forces, and this temporary solution worked as long as the militia’s interests 
were aligned with those of the fledgling government. As a result, the militias only grew more 
powerful and as competition between the different factions came to the fore, the security 
apparatus split along these lines. Already heavily armed, in part by the Allies during the 
intervention, factions helped themselves generously to Gaddafi’s armouries that were opened 
up for all to plunder. The international community missed an opportunity by not guarding the 
huge stockpiles of arms and ammunition, failing to prevent the widespread proliferation of 
lethal weaponry throughout the country and beyond. The availability of small arms not only 
increased the power of the militias, but also fed criminality and led to a spiral of insecurity 
that became difficult to control. Libyan weapons have since turned up all over Africa. 
 
Although the elections were marked by a reasonable turnout and a win for the moderate 
factions, the newly elected government inherited a state without any functioning institutions. 
By ‘coup proofing’ his army and implementing a divide and rule policy, Gaddafi had ensured 
that the rebels did not inherit a functioning bureaucracy, effective security apparatus or active 
civil society. Distrust between the rebels and military units that had later joined the uprising 
would continue to cast a shadow over the legitimacy over large parts of the army. As the 
militias  furthered  their  own  interests  in  areas  under  their  control,  and  impunity  and 
lawlessness in many regions set in, the national government started to lose what little 
legitimacy it had. The United Nations deployed the UNSMIL mission, but the ‘light footprint’ 
did not allow a good investment in SSR projects. The Libyan partners had little will or 
capacity to take difficult decisions, and much advice on SSR was ignored. The crucial 
relationship between security and development was well illustrated by the catalogue of 
incidents that occurred in 2012-2013. As security waned, armed factions filled the vacuum 
and international delegations and embassies became targets. Many had lucky escapes and near 
misses, others were not so fortunate; US Ambassador Stevens was specifically targeted on 11 
September 2012 and did not survive. International offices were subsequently evacuated or 
closed, and security precautions further impeded development projects and international 
business investing in Libya. As insecurity slowly turned into civil war in 2014, even the EU 
border management mission and UNSMIL were forced to relocate to Tunisia. 
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The atomized landscape of competing militias became a binary division as the civil war split 
the country into two. In the east, General Haftar and the Zintan forces faced the faction of 
Dawn  and  Misrata.  The  internationally recognized  Council  of  Deputies,  democratically 
elected in 2014, now reside in Tobruk, while Islamist factions resuscitated the General 
National Congress, and are based in Tripoli. While a UN peace-deal was signed in December 
2015 between both factions, seemingly ending political paralysis, elements within both parties 
oppose the agreement. Meanwhile, different groups such as the Islamic State are benefiting 
from the power vacuum and lack of central authority, establishing control over several coastal 
towns such as Sirte. Egypt has supported Haftar and launched airstrikes against IS after the 
murder of the Copts that were taken hostage, but will probably not launch a ground 
intervention. Qatar and Turkey have provided support to Islamist factions, but are equally 
unwilling to become more involved. Libya has thus become a battleground for regional 
interests, and its lawlessness has a destabilising effect on its neighbours. Both the Islamic 
State and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operate without restriction in Libya, and 
conduct attacks in Tunisia, Algeria and the broader Sahel. In part to block the influx of 
terrorist fighters from Libya into Niger, France launched operation Barkhane, a multi-national 
counterterrorist operation. But limited capacity combined with the difficulty of securing the 
borders in the vast expanses of the Sahara make this a stop-gap solution, addressing only 
some of the symptoms and leaving the causes for what they are. 
 
From a strategic perspective, the military intervention in Libya prevented a potential massacre 
of rebels in Benghazi, and removed strongman Gaddafi from power. During his 42 years in 
power, democracy and human rights were largely absent; as was the phenomenon of local 
terrorism, in part due to his ruthless repression of any opposition to his regime. Now, four 
years later, the lack of a central government has led to an almost complete breakdown of 
security and law and order, allowing terrorist groups to establish a foothold in several regions 
and expand the operations and recruitment efforts. The intervening powers have recognized 
that the transition after the intervention was a failure, and that they themselves are partly to 
blame for not investing enough capacity and effort into rebuilding Libyan society. It is not 
just the West however, that deserves blame for Libya’s descent into civil war and anarchy, as 
Libyan leaders are equally responsible for the current situation. Libya is the first victim of the 
choices made by all parties during the intervention and failure, but immigration and terrorism 
also pose a serious threat to Europe and the broader region. In 2011 decision-makers faced a 
complex situation and had, in part due to the specific political context at the time, little leeway 
to maneuver. However, by neglecting to follow-up on the military intervention and invest in a 
transition, the international community has contributed to making the complex and dangerous 
situation in Libya that more intractable. 
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